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INTRODUCTION
Expressive conceptions of practical reason, morality, and law are
gaining increasing currency. At the most general level, expressive
theories tell actors-whether individuals, associations, or the State-to
act in ways that express appropriate attitudes toward various substan-
tive values. In one well-known version, the State is required to express
equal respect and concern toward citizens. Expressivists do not pres-
ent this view as some radically new theory of morality and law. In-
stead, we claim that much of our existing practices of moral and legal
evaluation are best understood through expressivist perspectives-but
that the more perspicaciously we can grasp the expressive structure of
action, the more we can improve our evaluative practices. Expressiv-
ism is thus an internal account of existing normative practices, but
one with sufficient critical capacity to exert leverage over those prac-
tices and to indicate where they ought to be reformed.
This Article provides a more comprehensive account than has
previously appeared of the aims and features of such theories. It be-
gins with a general analysis of the nature of expression. Next, we show
how expressive concerns figure into normative theories of individual
conduct: what makes an action morally right depends on whether it
expresses the appropriate valuations of (that is, attitudes toward) per-
sons. From individual morality, we move to the expressive character
of collective action. Against skeptical claims to the contrary, we argue
that most of the purposes, beliefs, attitudes, intentions, and other
mental states that individuals can have on their own can also be prop-
erly attributed to groups, including the State. With these general ac-
counts of expression and collective action in place, we then seek to
show the pervasively expressive character of much of the law. We
concentrate on constitutional law to exemplify this character, for we
cannot here apply expressive accounts to all the fields in which such
accounts have been emerging, such as environmental policy or crimi-
nal punishment. But one of our central aims, here and elsewhere,' is
See Richard H. Pildes, Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive
Harms, and Constitutionalism, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 725, 725 (1998) [hereinafter Trumps]
(arguing that "[c]onstitutional theory misunderstands actual constitutional practice
because the dominant strands of contemporary rights theory miss the role of social
meanings and norms in giving content to constitutional rights"); Richard H. Pildes &
Elizabeth S. Anderson, SlingingArrows at Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism,
and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 2121 (1990) (developing an expressive un-
derstanding of rational choice and criticizing conventional rational-choice theory and
social-choice theory for failing to take the expressive dimensions of rationality into ac-
count); Richard H. Pildes & Richard G. Niemi, Expressive Harms, "Bizarre Districts," and
EXPRESSMSM: A GENERAL RESTATEMENT
to show that much of constitutional doctrine-ranging from structural
issues, like the Dormant Commerce Clause and federalism, to more
rights-oriented and equality issues, such as the Establishment Clause
and Equal Protection-is best understood through the conception we
develop of the expressive dimensions of state action.
Matthew Adler's article impressively synthesizes the different work
2on expressivism that has emerged in diverse fields of law. His work
also brings a much appreciated philosophical rigor to these issues.
Adler's analysis of expressivism poses two central and difficult ques-
tions that serve as the framework for his critique. First, what does it
mean for action to express values or attitudes? Is this the same as ac-
tors intending to communicate those values or attitudes? If not, what
is the difference between expression and communication? And why
should we care about expression in the precise sense that expressive
theories invoke? On these related questions, we will argue that Ad-
ler's objections rest on a fundamental misunderstanding of the con-
cept of expression and the role it plays in expressive theories of law
and morality. Second, even if it makes sense at the level of individual
morality to care about the attitudes individuals express toward each
other through their actions, how can it make sense to worry about col-
lective actors-particularly the democratic State-expressing values
and attitudes? Can collective actors actually have mental states, such
as attitudes, that we attribute to individuals? Is this some deep meta-
physical confusion?
On this second important theme, this Article will define the cir-
Voting Rights: Evaluating Election-District Appearances After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L.
REV. 483, 483-84 (1993) (discussing voting-rights controversies and the constitutional
principles that characterize Shaw). Robert Nozick similarly argues that rational choice
theory must be reconceived so as to recognize the symbolic utility of acts, as well as
their more familiar causal utility. Nozick argues that "the symbolic connection of an
action to a situation enables the action to be expressive of some attitude, belief, value,
emotion, or whatever." ROBERT NOZICK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY 28 (1993). To
those who would deny the importance to an adequate decision theory of the expressive
or symbolic dimension of action, Nozick rightly says, "A large part of the richness of
our lives consists in symbolic meanings and their expression, the symbolic meanings
our culture attributes to things or the ones we ourselves bestow." Id. at 30. Indeed,
Nozick concedes that his earlier political claims in ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE,
AND UTOPIA (1974), are inadequate precisely because they fail to recognize "the im-
portance to us ofjoint and official serious symbolic statement and expression of our
social ties aid concern." NOZIcK, THE NATURE OF RATIONALITY, supra, at 32. As he
now says: "The libertarian view looked solely at the purpose of government, not at its
meaning hence, it took an unduly narrow view of purpose, too." ROBERT NozicK, THE
EXAMINED LIFE: PHILOSOPHICALMEDITATIONS 288 (1989).
2 See Matthew D. Adler, Expressive Theories of Law: A Skeptical Overview, 148 U. PA. L.
REV. 1363 (2000).
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cumstances under which it makes sense to attribute mental states to
collective agents, such as the democratic State. We will also explore
why the expression of these attitudes through state action is indeed a
central focal point of constitutional law, as we believe it is and ought
to be. Adler is right to raise these two central themes-the nature of
expression and of collective agency-as crucial ones for expressivists
to engage. But with a proper understanding of these crucial concepts
in place, we will show why expressive theories of law are not prone to
the kinds of critiques Adler makes.
I. EXPRESSIVE THEORIES OF REASON AND ETHICS IN GENERAL
A. The Concept of Expression
"Expression" refers to the ways that an action or a statement (or
any other vehicle of expression) manifests a state of mind. The state
of mind can be cognitive-it can be a belief, idea, or theory. The
characteristic vehicles for expressing such purely cognitive states are
declarative sentences, which can be uttered in speech or writing. But
people can also express their cognitive states in action. In burning
the United States flag, antiwar protesters expressed the belief that
United States involvement in the Vietnam war was wrong.3
People can express other kinds of mental states besides beliefs,
such as moods, emotions, attitudes, desires, intentions, and personal-
ity traits. They can do so not only through speech and instrumental
action, but through gestures, tone of voice, posture, forms of art, and
other ways. At the level of individual action, a shrug may express in-
difference; a whisper, reverence; a swagger, cockiness; a song, joy; a
sneer, contempt. At the level of state action, as we will show, delibera-
tive principles and policies can be appropriately interpreted as ex-
pressing official state beliefs and attitudes, such as hostility toward cer-
tain racial groups or approval of religion. Indeed, the law frequently
treats state action as doing exactly this, as we will seek to demonstrate
and justify.
The relationship between states of mind and their expressions has
three dimensions: ontological, epistemic, and normative.4 First, ex-
pressions of mental states embody and realize those states. Second, ex-
s See infra note 6 and accompanying text.
4 See Charles Taylor, Action As Expression, in INTENTION AND INT ONA=IY 73, 78-
89 (Cora Diamond &Jenny Teichman eds., 1979) (demonstrating how action satisfies
the first two dimensions of expression).
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pressions of mental states manifest those states: they cast them in a
form that makes them recognizable as what they are. Third, expressive
vehicles can do a better or worse job of expressing mental states. Let
us consider each of these dimensions in more detail.
Expressive mental states may be viewed as potentialities that can
be realized in more than one expression. They are mere potentialities
in the sense that they require expression to be fully realized. If a fa-
ther never pays attention to his daughter's interests, and never takes
those interests as reasons for him to help her and to avoid harming
her, we say that he does not actually love her. But if, out of love for
his daughter, he did take her interests as a reason to help her, then
his helping would, in expressing his love, realize it or make it real.
For any state of mind, there are many different ways of expressing it.
A person expresses the same thought in thinking "I am warm" as in
saying "Es ist mir warm." Either the English or the German expres-
sion can be said to embody the same thought. The expressive relation
is therefore a relation of realization or embodiment.
The expression of a mental state brings that state into the open,
for oneself and potentially for others to recognize. People recognize
the mental state in its expression. This is an interpretive activity. To
interpret what a statement means, we try to grasp what the speaker is
saying. To interpret what an action means, we try to identify what the
agent is doing. Deeds are identified, not by mere physical descrip-
tions of bodily movement, but by the intentions that they express and
that give them meaning. Interpretation is a matter of making sense of
the speech or action in its context. Suppose an individual burns a
piece of paper. What does this mean? If the paper is a draft card, and
he burns it in the context of others doing the same thing at an antiwar
rally, we understand his action to express outrage at the draft.
6
Finally, states of mind stand in a normative relation to whatever
expresses them. We can evaluate any vehicle of expression, whether a
statement or action, in terms of how well it expresses its mental states.
A speech may express ideas poorly by being confused, disorganized,
vague, ambiguous, or inarticulate. Conduct also may express inten-
5 Of course, some mental activities such as contemplation can be kept in one's
head. But it is only through the use of expressive media, such as words or pictures,
that one can recognize one's own thoughts. The same expressive forms of media that
are capable of manifesting one's thoughts to oneself are, in principle, capable of mani-
festing those same thoughts to others, when made public.
6 SeeUnited States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 369 (1968) (involving the burning of a
draft card to protest the war in Vietnam).
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tions, emotions, and attitudes poorly-for example, by being clumsy,
distracted, self-defeating, or ambivalent. A bumbling lover's infatua-
tion may cause him to express his love in awkward ways that repel his
beloved. Such incongruity between the mental state and its manifesta-
tions is the stuff of comedy-or, if the failure is serious enough, of
tragedy.
The concept of expression should be contrasted with causation,
on the one hand, and communication, on the other. The expressive
relation is not a causal relation between a mental state and that which
expresses it. Not everything that expresses a state of mind is caused by
that state of mind. Musicians can play music that expresses sadness,
without feeling sad themselves. The music they play need not express
their (or anyone's) sadness: the sadness is in the music itself. Simi-
larly, lawmakers could pass a law that expresses contempt for blacks by
denying them the right to vote, even if none of the lawmakers person-
ally feel contempt for blacks and all are merely pandering to their
white constituents. Conversely, not everything caused by a state of
mind expresses that state of mind. The state of excitement causes
some narcoleptics to fall asleep.7 This does not make sleep an expres-
sion of excitement.
Expression must also be distinguished from communication. To
express a mental state requires only that one manifest it in speech or
action. To communicate a mental state requires that one express it
with the intent that others recognize that state by recognizing that
very communicative intention. One can express a mental state with-
out intending to communicate it. The shoplifter may express her in-
tention to get away with stealing a purse in her furtive glances. But
she hardly intends to communicate this intention. Action, by defini-
tion, expresses intentions, and therefore always has expressive mean-
ing.
B. Expressive Theories of Individual Conduct
A normative theory of action is an expressive theory if it evaluates
actions in terms of how well they express certain intentions, attitudes,
or other mental states. An expressive theory of action must therefore
(a) prescribe norms for regulating the adoption of certain mental
states, and (b) require actions and statements to express these states
See BEDRICH RoTH, NARCOLEPSY AND HYPERSOMNIA 64 (Roger Broughton ed. &
Margaret Schierlova trans., 1980) (explaining how "some patients fall asleep after an
outburst of emotion").
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adequately. This Part focuses on expressive theories of rationality and
morality. Later, the discussion will tm to expressive theories of law.
Most of what we morally ought to do, we ought to do for the sake
of people. Therefore, from a moral point of view, people are what is
fundamentally valuable. But how are people valuable? Expressive
theories of morality interpret this question to mean: how should we
value, or care about, people? Different moral theories answer this
question differently. In Kantian ethics, we are supposed to respect all
persons.9 In the ethics of care, advanced by some feminists and in
much of ordinary moral thought, we are supposed to love and be con-
cerned for those with whom we have special relationships.10 Virtue eth-
ics tells us to be benevolent, grateful, and considerate to the appropriate
people, to honor and admire others, and so forth." All of these theories
tell us that we ought to adopt particular attitudes toward people.
From the point of view of practical reason, much of what we find
ourselves having reason to do stems from the ways we care about peo-
ple. We feel friendly toward our friends, collegial toward our col-
leagues, erotically attracted to our lovers, concerned for ourselves,
and so forth. Practical reason does not require that we take up these
attitudes toward particular persons. But, there are standards for ra-
tionally holding these attitudes. For example, it is irrational to be-
friend an evil person. Suppose, then, we have a rational or morally
required attitude toward a person. How can such an attitude give us
reason for action?
To understand how rational attitudes can give us reasons for ac-
tion, we must first understand what an attitude is. An attitude toward
a person is a complex set of dispositions to perceive, have emotions,
deliberate, and act in ways oriented toward that person. Consider
parents who love their children. Loving parents are disposed to no-
tice things concerning their children-how well they are nourished
8 Animals, nature, and perhaps other things also may be fundamentally valuable.
To keep matters simple, this discussion is confined to the value of people. Nothing in
the analysis would change, though, if we added that animals, ecosystems, and the like
are also fundamentally important.
9 See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF TBE METAPHYSIC OF MORALS 96 (H.J.
Paton trans., Harper Torchbooks 1964) (1797) ("Act in such a way that you always
treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never sim-
ply as a means, but always at the same time as an end.").
'0 See, e.g., NEL NODDINGS, CARING 6 (1984) ("It is the recognition of and longing
for relatedness that form the foundation of our ethic .... ").
" See generally ARISTOTLE, Nicomachean Ethics, reprinted in 2 THM COnLETE WORKS
OF ARISTOTLE 1729 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984) (presenting the classical formulation
of virtue ethics).
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and clothed, what they are learning and doing, events likely to interest
them, emotional problems they are facing, and so forth. The things
they notice concerning their children tend to arouse their emotions.
They are alarmed at threats to their children's safety, take pride in
their children's achievements, share their children's delight in the
things they do together, and so forth. Let us call the things about
which someone is emotionally aroused the objects of their emotions.
A crucial function of emotions is to make their objects salient for de-
liberation.12 A parent's alarm at seeing her toddler poke a key into an
electrical outlet represents this fact as a threat to her toddler, and pre-
sents it to deliberation as an urgent reason to take preventive action.
Loving parents tend to respond to such reasons.
Parents express their love for their children by manifesting all
these dispositions. Normative expressive theories are interested in the
expression of attitudes through action. They tell us that the rational
(moral) thing to do is to act in ways that express our rational (or mor-
ally required) attitudes toward people. The above analysis suggests
that the key connection between attitudes and actions is provided by
reasons for action. To express an attitude through action is to act on
the reasons that attitude gives us. Let us therefore define a norm or
principle for expressing an attitude as a rule that tells us what to count
(and reject) as reasons for adopting particular ends. For example,
norms of parental love tell parents to take their children's needs as
reasons for taking care of them. Norms of democratic equality or fra-
ternity require us to reject the end of subordinating a racial group as a
reason to classify people by race.
Expressive theories of action are fundamentally concerned not
just with achieving certain ends, nor with prescribing or proscribing
certain means (types of action), but with whether the connection be-
tween the means and the end is justified. They ask: does performing
act A for the sake of goal G express rational or morally right attitudes
toward people? That is, would a person who had rational or morally
right attitudes toward people accept G as a reason to do A?
This approach to evaluating action diverges from both a purely
12 Neuropsychology has shown that people who lack emotions cannot deliberate
rationally because they cannot focus on important features of their situation. See
ANTONIO D'AMsIO, DESCARTES' ERROR at xii (1994) ("[R]eason may not be as pure as
most of us think it is or wish it were, [and] emotions and feelings may not be intruders
in the bastion of reason at all: they may be enmeshed in its networks, forworse and for
better.").
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consequentialist approach,3 which approves of any means that pro-
duces the "best" results, and from what might be called "vulgar deon-
tology,,' 4 which proscribes certain generic types of action (lying, steal-
ing, killing) altogether, regardless of the consequences. To see more
clearly the importance of evaluating the means-end connection, con-
sider the following rationales for actions:'
(a) I will avoid visiting my mother in the hospital, in order to
avoid transmitting my contagious illness to her.
(b) I will avoid visiting my mother in the hospital, in order to
spare myself unpleasantness.
(c) I will avoid watching television, in order to spare myself
unpleasantness.
Rationales (a) and (b) involve the same type of act, but action
based on the first reason is permissible, or even required, while follow-
ing the second is arguably wrong. This demonstrates that what makes
(b) wrong is not that it involves a categorically forbidden type of ac-
tion. Furthermore, it is not that there is something generally imper-
missible about the goal of (b) either, because (c) has the same goal,
but is clearly permissible. What is wrong with (b) is taking the goal of
avoiding unpleasantness as a justification for avoiding visiting one's
mother in the hospital. In expressivist terms, avoiding her for this
reason is wrong because taking this as one's reason for acting is cal-
Inus. and it is wrong to exnress such an uncaring attitude toward one's
I_ - -. . . . . .. .-_ a . .- _ -s _
mother.
6
Thus, expressive norms regulate actions by regulating the acceptable justi-
fications for doing them. People express their reasons for a given action
through their intentions (which, at their simplest, have the form: I
shall do act A in order to bring about end G). So, expressive norms
regulate actions by regulating the adoption of intentions. The fun-
damental principle of an expressive theory of action is:
" See generally DEREK PARnT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984) (presenting a conse-
quentialist framework for actions).
"4 This view is known by its sympathizers as "moral absolutism." See, e.g., PETER
GEACH, GOD AND THE SOUL 117-29 (1969) (arguing that it is impossible to defy the
moral absolutes of divine law).
"- We borrow the examples (with modification) and the general point of this para-
graph from CHRIsTINE M. KORsGAARD, CREATING THE KINGDOM OF ENDs 75 n.58
(1996).
16 That it would be wrong to act callously toward one's mother does not imply that
I ought to visit my mother. For it may also be the case that if I did visit, I would com-
municate a contagious illness to my mother. I have an obligation not to endanger her,
so I ought not to visit.
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E: Act in ways that express the right attitudes toward persons;
that is:
E'. Act in accordance with norms that express the right atti-
tudes toward persons.
We have just argued that the basic form of an expressive norm is:
R Take (or do not take) goal Gas a reason for doing A.
17
Notice that G is not E. Expressive theories of action do not say
that one ought to take the expression of one's attitudes toward others
as one's goal in acting. Expressive theories do not somehow tell us to
maximize the amount of proper expression in the world. Instead, ex-
pressive theories are regulative theories that provide principled con-
straints on how we go about pursuing various ends. In this respect,
expressive theories are like the rules of grammar or logic. Those rules
do not tell us to maximize the amount of correct grammatical or logi-
cal statements in the world, as if that itself were the goal. Instead,
those rules tell us that when we are speaking or reasoning, we should
do so subject to certain regulative constraints.
Thus, in the moral domain, we express our benevolence in taking
the advancement of others' interests as our goal, not in taking our
own desire to be benevolent as our goal. We satisfy E in the course of
pursuing the right goals, in the right way, for the right reasons. E
functions as a regulative principle for intentions, not as a goal of ac-
tion.
Expressive theories of action tell us to express certain attitudes
adequately. The standard of adequacy is not met simply by intending
to express those attitudes, or by thinking that one's actions do express
those attitudes. Rather, the standard of adequacy is public, set by ob-
jective criteria for determining the meanings of action.
What attitudes people intend to express or think they are express-
ing can deviate from the public meaning of their action in at least
three ways. First, they might act negligently or thoughtlessly, by failing
to notice or take certain considerations as reasons for action. Teen-
agers blaring their car horn late at night might be consciously intend-
ing only to signal a friend to join them. But in failing to consider or
to take the neighbors' interests in peace and quiet as a reason for ac-
1 A more complete representation of reason-giving principles would also have to
include the considerations that one may or may not act, that is, in spite of foreseen but
unintended consequences of the act in question. It may be permissible to take G as a
reason for doing A, but only on condition that doing A does not have some unin-
tended consequences that ought to weigh decisively against doing A.
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tion, their behavior expresses inconsiderateness toward their neigh-
bors. Second, people may act in ignorance of social conventions or
norms that set public standards for expressing certain attitudes. Thus,
a person from a different culture might not know he is expressing dis-
respect for another by failing to shake his hand. Third, people may
act on attitudes or assumptions of which they are unaware. In review-
ing a novel, the reviewer might contemptuously interpret the text in
ways that make the author look simpleminded. The reviewer might
not be aware of her contempt for the author. She may just have diffi-
culty imagining that he is capable of sophistication, and therefore in-
terprets the author's words accordingly.
It follows that people's conscious purposes and intentions, while
relevant, are not the sole determinants of what attitudes their actions
express. That is, an agent's sincerely avowed purposes are not the sole
determinants of what her actions mean. Expressive theories of action
hold people accountable for the public meanings of their actions.
This is true of collective actors as well, as legal doctrine already recog-
nizes. The articulated reasons of legislators can be relevant in deter-
mining whether a state law expresses impermissible purposes or val-
ues, but ultimately it is a question of law, and hence of external
normative judgment, whether the state action does indeed express
impermissible purposes or values.
Expressive theories of action evaluate given actions according to
how well they express attitudes that we ought to have toward people.
Stated at this level of abstraction, expressive theories may seem
strange and counterintuitive. Isn't the point of action to bring about
good consequences? Shouldn't we evaluate actions in terms of how
well they bring about good consequences? If you think expressive
theories somehow deny this, you are probably imagining that these
theories prescribe the expression of attitudes as a goal to be pursued,
regardless of other consequences. This is to mistake E as a goal-setting
principle, rather than as a regulative principle for intentions. This
mistake leads people to think that expressive evaluation somehow re-
quires us to ignore the consequences of action-an absurd position.
Expressivism rejects this position. We cannot adequately express
the right attitudes toward people while ignoring the consequences of
our actions. We express our respect, love, concern, and other favor-
able attitudes toward people largely through the pursuit of conse-
quences that are good for them. To disregard the consequences of
one's actions is one way to fail to care about people in the ways we
ought to care about them. Expressive theories, therefore, tell us to
20001 513
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pursue consequences that are good for people, provided that pursu-
ing those consequences by the means selected is compatible with car-
ing about people in the right ways.
Expressive theories, therefore, do not deny that the consequences
matter. Rather, they tell us why the consequences matter, and which
consequences matter. We ought to care about the consequences of
our actions for people because we ought to care about people. If
people were not worth caring about, then we would not have reason
to pay attention to their interests. Which consequences involve their
interests is determined by which consequences would arouse the ra-
tional concern of whoever cares about them.18 Expressive theories tell
us which consequences matter, and what actions toward them are jus-
tified.
This Part has described expressive theories of action as they apply
to individual conduct. According to these views, we are all morally re-
quired to express the right attitudes toward people, and we all have
good reason to express our rational attitudes toward people. We be-
lieve that similar normative principles apply to the actions of collective
agents, including the actions of States. To understand why this is so,
we need to understand what collective agents are, and how they too
are capable of expressing purposes, attitudes, and other mental states.
II. EXPRESSION AND COLLEcr1VE ArION
A. Collective Agents in General
In conventional discourse, we speak without puzzlement about so-
cial groups or collective actors having beliefs, emotions, attitudes,
goals, and even characters. People say that the big tobacco companies
knew they were lying when they denied that cigarettes are addictive;
that Russia is angered at NATO's expansion plans; that rival gangs
hate each other; that the Congressional Budget Office is trustworthy
and nonpartisan. Yet, the ascriptions of mental states to collectives
seems puzzling to some philosophers and social scientists. Max Weber
insisted that "there is no such thing as a collective personality which
'acts."' 19 With the rise of rational-choice theory and methodological
individualism in many domains of social science, this skepticism about
"See generally Stephen Darwall, Self-Interest and Self-Concern, Soc. PHIL. & POL'Y,
Winter 1997, at 158.
19 MAX WEBER, 1 ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 14 (Gunther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
University of California Press 1978) (1922).
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collective agency has become, in some academic circles, more pro-
nounced than ever-conventional discourse notwithstanding.
However, recent work on collective agents provides a systematic
analysis of how we can meaningfully ascribe purposes, beliefs, and
other mental states to social groups-and thereby help vindicate our
everyday understandings of group action.0 Margaret Gilbert provides
a key insight to understanding what this amounts to by arguing that
certain collectives should be viewed as "plural subjects."21 A group is a
plural subject if its members (1) can properly refer to themselves as
"we," and (2) make normative claims upon one another in virtue of
their belonging to that "we."22
Consider the fact that almost any activity I can do alone, we can do
together. I can walk by myself; we can walk together. I can cook a
meal by myself, we can cook a meal together. I can talk to myself; we
can have a conversation. Skeptics about collective agents might try to
argue that such "we" talk amounts to nothing more than ascribing
such activities to all or most members of the group in question. But
our doing something together is not the same as each of us engaging
in the same activity unilaterally. Each of us could be hiking along the
same trail at the same time, in close proximity. This is not enough for
us to be hiking together. What more is needed for us to be doing
something together? s
Suppose a snowstorm buries a street. Each of several neighbors
starts digging out, with the personal goal of clearing the snow from
the street. Although each neighbor is engaged in the same activity,
with the same end in view, they are not yet clearing out the snow to-
gether. The snow might be so high that each is unaware of the others'
efforts. So let us add common knowledge to their activities. Each
neighbor knows that everyone else is digging, with the goal of clearing
their street, and everyone knows that everyone knows this. Still, they
20 We draw heavily upon MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FAaTs (1989), in the fol-
lowing discussion. Other accounts of collective agency have been developed in
ANNETTE C. BAlER, THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (1997); Michael E. Bratman, Shared
Intention, 104 ETHICS 97 (1993); John 1L Searle, Collective Intentions and Actions, in
INTENTIONS IN COMMUNICATION 401 (Philip R. Cohen et al. eds., 1990);J. David Vel-
leman, How To Share an Intention, 57 PHIL. & PHENOMENOLOGICAL REs. 29 (1997). See
generally 2 CONTEMPORARY ACTION THEORY: SOCIAL ACrlON (Ghita Holmstrm-
Hintikka & Raimo Tuomela eds., 1997).
21 GILBERT, supra note 20, at 204.
22Id. at 205, 380-81.
The following two paragraphs closely follow the argument of Margaret Gilbert,
Walking Together A Paradigmatic SocialPhenomenon, 15 MIDWEST STUD. PHIL. 1 (1990).
20001 1515
1516 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVEW [Vol. 148:1503
are not acting together: their actions might not be coordinated in the
right way. Some of the neighbors might be blowing snow into areas
that others have just cleared. So let us add coordination to these ef-
forts. Suppose each neighbor acts on her own to coordinate her ac-
tions with that of others, so that the street cleaning is efficiently car-
ried out, and that this is common knowledge to all. Even this is not
enough to make it true that they are digging out the street together,
because any neighbor could decide to stop, and no one else would
have a claim on them to continue their activity. Each still acts merely
on a personal goal, not on a collective goal, to clear out the street. To
count as a "we," a plural subject acting together on a collective goal,
each member of the group must further acknowledge a commitment
or obligation to the others to act in concert with them to achieve that
goal.
24
Suppose the neighbors agree with one another that they will join
together to clear out the street. They could do this explicitly through
an oral agreement; or they could have agreed in advance to empower
some subgroup, say an association of block leaders, to make collective
commitments to which they would all agree to be bound. At this
point, they are committed to digging out the street together. What has
happened? These acts of communication, or delegated power, have
manifested each neighbor's willingness to join forces with the others
in achieving a common goal, conditional on the others' open willing-
ness to do the same. They publicly acknowledge a shared understand-
ing of the basis upon which they are to act. This shared understand-
ing is one in which each is conditionally committed to the others to
act to achieve a common aim as, in effect, a single body. These com-
munications of conditional commitments create a collective agent or
plural subject, entitling each member to refer to them all as "we," and
to make claims upon one another in the name of what we are sup-
posed to be doing. These shared understandings obligate each mem-
ber to take our goal as a reason for acting. Members claim these rights
and obligations by virtue of their membership in the group, not be-
cause the individuals in question have an independent moral duty to
24 In confirmation of the view that there is a necessary connection between plural
subjecthood and mutual obligations, consider the following exchange between two
neighbors: A: "Where are you going? I thought we were digging out the street to-
gether." B: "What do you mean, 'we'?" A claims a right to sanction B for unilaterally
withdrawing from the shared goal, and B defends himself by refusing to acknowledge
membership in the group. This exchange would make no sense if both parties did not
understand that plural subjecthood entails obligations. These obligations may, of
course, be overridden by other goals.
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unilaterally engage in the activity in question.
This account suggests a general formula for what it means for a
collective to have purpose, attitude, belief, principle for action, or
other mental state:
A group, G, has mental state M if and only if the members of G
are jointly committed to expressing Mas a body.
To express M as a body is to express it together, not just as a col-
lection of unilateral acts. The members of G are jointly committed to
expressing Mwhen each manifests a willingness to express M together
with the others, conditional upon the others manifesting a like will-
ingness. M could be any kind of mental state: purpose, belief, princi-
ple, reason for action, emotionr attitude, and so forth. The concept
of "expression" used in this definition is the broad one explicated
above. If M is a purpose, its basic expression is in collective action
aimed at M. If Mis a belief, it may be expressed in the group's avowal
of it (for example, through an authorized spokesperson), or more
generally in every member's willingness to accept conclusions that
take Mas a premise, or that would make no sense in the given context
unless M were taken as true. If M is a principle of action, it is ex-
pressed in actions that follow M.
When groups share beliefs, they are often the product of success-
ful conversational exchange.26 Suppose, while waiting for the bus, two
people discuss whether the clouds in the sky threaten rain. One says,
"Those clouds look like they are getting dark, so we'll be getting rain."
The other replies, "No, they just look dark because the sun is setting."
The first says, "Oh," nodding in agreement. This conversation estab-
lishes, through joint acknowledgment of the claim that the clouds do
not indicate rain, a belief held by the conversational group. Hence-
forth, further conversational exchanges, if they are to make sense, will
27proceed on the assumption that rain is not impending. "Better get
See MARGARET GILBERT, Collective Remorse, in SOciALnY AND RESPONSIBILrlY 123,
128 (2000) (arguing that groups can have emotions); MAX SCEELER, THE NATURE OF
SYMPATHY 12-13 (1970) ("[A]ll fellow-feeling involves intentional reference of the feeling
ofjoy or sorrow to the other person's experience.").
21 On the analysis of collective belief, we follow Margaret Gilbert, Remarks on Collec-
tive Belief in SOCIALIZING EPISTEMOLOGY: THE SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF KNOWLEDGE 285
(Frederick F. Schmitt ed., 1994), and GILBERT, supra note 20, at 237-314.
2 Alternatively, one might call for revision of the previously accepted conclusion in
light of new evidence. Note how apt it would be, in this case, to acknowledge the pre-
vious group belief in the call for revision. "I know we just agreed that it wasn't going to
rain, but wasn't that the sound of thunder?" What one may not sensibly do is talk as if
thejoint agreementwere not in force.
2o00 1517
1518 UNIVERS1TY OFPEMNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:1503
your umbrella!" would not be a coherent response by either party in
light of the claims they just acknowledged together. Shared beliefs
perform the vital function of enabling conversation to proceed on a
commonly understood basis.
Groups can also share principles of action, social norms, or con-
ventions. A culture might have a convention to wear black at funerals.
In this case, everyone who identifies and is accepted as a member re-
gards herself as obligated to follow the convention, in virtue of the
fact that every member is jointly committed to it 2 A principle of ac-
tion might also take the form of a regulative principle for intentions,
of form R. In deliberating together about what to do, a group may be
committed to accepting certain considerations as reasons for action
and rejecting others. Each neighbor may personally dislike a particu-
lar resident of the street. Yet, in the name of neighborliness, they may
jointly commit themselves to a deliberative principle excluding con-
sideration of anyone's personal dislikes of their neighbors as a reason
to guide the actions of their block association. Then, although each
member of the block association dislikes this resident, the block asso-
ciation itself does not. Indeed, the block association may be positively
friendly toward the disliked neighbor, inviting him to block parties
and the like. This shows that groups can express attitudes that none of
its members have individually. This is possible because individuals can
commit themselves to express attitudes that are not their own. When
they do so in their capacities as group members, they act as agents or
spokespersons for the group.
In stressing our abilities to act and think together, and recogniz-
ing obligations rooted in our collective identities, we do not suggest
that people always follow these obligations, or that these obligations
override other reasons for action. Individuals have multiple conflict-
ing identities, both collective and individual. Sometimes individual
members of a group act in accordance with a decision frame in which
they regard themselves as 'T's rather than as "we." This is why ex-
planatory strategies based on methodological individualism, as exem-
plified in rational choice theory, often provide insight into human af-
fairs, especially when collective action breaks down. Nevertheless, we
2s See GILBERT, supra note 20, at 373 (arguing that conventions are constituted by
joint conditional commitments among the members for whom it is valid). This analy-
sis directly challenges David Lewis's famous account of convention. See DAVID LEWIS,
CONVEINION: A PHILosoPHIcAL STUDY 36-51 (1969) (arguing that conventions arise
from individual strategically rational choice in coordination games, without involving
any obligations ofjoint commitment). See generally GILBERT, supra note 20, at 329-67
(providing a critique of Lewis's account).
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observe far more cooperation and successful collective action than
can be explained by rational choice theory. Moreover, collective ac-
tion often breaks down because a group's members identify with
competing collective identities, rather than because its members pur-
sue their self-interest at the expense of the group's goals. Social theo-
ries that recognize the reality of full-fledged collective action can ex-
plain these phenomena without denying the genuine insights of
individualist approaches to explaining human action.
This Article has argued that collectives can have beliefs and pur-
poses and can act on reasons and principles of action. Because
collectives are capable of responding to reasons, they can respond to
reasons for having attitudes. Groups, be they legislatures, political as-
sociations, or social groups, can therefore also act on the reasons
those attitudes give them. Groups thereby have all of the mental ca-
pacities needed to have attitudes toward people. This is all that is re-
quired for collectives to be subject to expressive theories of reason
and morality.
It would be bizarre if things were otherwise. If I can express atti-
tudes toward people on my own, why can't we express attitudes toward
people together? And if the value of persons can morally demand
certain attitudes-say, respect-of all individuals acting on their own,
why can their value not morally demand the same attitude of indi-
viduals acting together? We do not suddenly become exempt from
fundamental moral demands simply by acting together on shared
goals, rather than independently on personal goals. There is no rea-
son to think that, in acting together, we become subject to a funda-
mentally different kind of moral or rational demand than applies to us
when we act independently. Of course, collectives stand in different
relations to people than their individual members do when they act as
2 See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes et al., Cooperation for the Benefit of Us-Not Me, or My Con-
science, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 97, 99 (Jane J. Mansbridge ed., 1990); Ernst Fehr &
Simon Gichter, How Effective Are Trust- and Reciprocity-Based IncentivesP, in ECONOMIcs,
VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION 337, 338 (Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman eds., 1998)
(discussing "why, in some organizations, [groups are] successful in selecting the high
effort equilibrium while in others shirking is the [norm]");John M. Orbell et al., Ex-
plaining Discussion-Induced Cooperation in Social Dilemmas, 54 J. PERsONAIflY & SOC.
PSYC HOL. 811 (1988); Andrew Schotter, Worker Trust, System Vulnerability, and the Per-
formance of Work Groups, in ECONOMICS, VALUES, AND ORGANIZATION, supra, at 364, 364
(concluding that "people do not always fully exploit their opportunities to violate
agreements at the expense of others"). For a general discussion of the relationship of
individualist to collective explanations of behavior, see Elizabeth Anderson, Beyond
Homo Economicus: New Developments in Economic Theories of Social Norms 21-28
(1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with authors).
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individuals. This implies that collectives often ought to have different
attitudes toward people than their individual members have, and are
thereby subject to different expressive demands. The demands, how-
ever, are still expressive and are not of a radically different, nonex-
pressive sort. Collectives are still required to express the right atti-
tudes toward people. That is, they ought to obey principles that take
the form of A, above: to take or reject certain goals as reasons for cer-
tain actions. We now turn to applying these principles to the actions
of a particular kind of collective agent, the democratic State.
B. The Democratic State As a Collective Agent
Expressive theories of law are concerned with evaluating state ac-
tion. On the rights and equality side of constitutional law, such theo-
ries assert that state action is required to express the appropriate atti-
tudes toward persons. State action must express "equal concern and
respect" for all persons (to cite Ronald Dworkin's well-known formula-
tion) . It also must express a collective understanding of all citizens as
equal members of the State, all equally part of "us," notwithstanding
their racial, ethnic, or religious differences. On the structural side, as
we shall show, such theories assert that various governmental institu-
tions, such as States or the national government, are obligated to ex-
press adequate conceptions of their relationships with other govern-
mental units.
To speak of governments as having attitudes may make some legal
theorists leery.1 Recall our argument that the fundamental way in
which actors express attitudes is by following principles of form R: to
take or reject certain considerations as reasons for action. In order to
ascribe attitudes to an agent coherently, therefore, we need only be
able to sensibly interpret the agent's actions as -resulting from rea-
sons-that is, as taking particular goals or purposes as reasons for par-
ticular actions.
This requires nothing more than what is routinely required when
judges engage in purposive interpretation of laws, whether in consti-
tutional or statutory interpretation. The understandings and practices
that underwrite conventional purposive interpretation are sufficient
to support expressive approaches to law. For example, Matthew Ad-
30 RONALD DWORIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 180 (1977).
3 As Lewis Kornhauser worries, this view might be thought to require that the
State be inappropriately "personified." Lewis A. Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U.
PA. L. REV. 1599, 1633 (1998).
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ler's view of constitutional rights as "rights against rules" requires pre-
cisely this kind of purposive interpretation. In his view, rights are not
general liberties of action, but are rather rights not to have the State
infringe upon certain individual liberties or interests for certain im-
32permissible purposes. To enforce this view of rights, courts must be
able to ascribe purposes, including illegitimate ones, to Congress.
With qualification, we share Adler's view that many constitutional
rights are best understood as constraints upon the kinds of reasons for
which the State can act.3 3 Expressivism adds to this a particular ac-
count of which purposes are illegitimate: those which, if Congress
adopted them as reasons for enacting laws, would express constitu-
tionally impermissible attitudes toward persons, such as hostility or
contempt for racial or ethnic groups. Neither Adler nor any other
purposive theorist is in a position to advance skepticism about the
ability of collectives to express meanings through their actions without
undermining the very purposive approach to interpretation those
theorists, in other contexts, defend.
Public-choice theorists can more consistently advance skepticism
of this form. To hold democratic States to expressive requirements
demands that we be able to ascribe reasonably coherent purposes to
them. Public-choice and social-choice theorists advance three princi-
pal forms of skepticism regarding the possibility of attributing such
purposes. The first is based on Arrow's Theorem.34 The Theorem
shows that, in a system of pairwise voting among multiple options un-
der nondictatorial conditions, there may be no consistent outcome
(no "Condorcet winner") that a majority of legislators prefers. A dif-
ferent outcome from the actual one might have been adopted if the
sequence of options being voted upon had been altered. The mere
adoption of proposal A, therefore, does not indicate that it is truly a
majority-preferred option. How, then, can we say that option A ex-
presses a collective purpose, attitude, or other mental state, when
32 See Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Consti-
tutional Law, 97 MICH. L. REv. 1, 13-42 (1998).
' See, e.g., Trumps, supra note 1, at 729-31 (arguing that rights do not create spheres
of absolute personal immunity but rather limit and channel the kinds of reasons for
which the government is permitted to act in distinct spheres).
Arrow's famous impossibility theorem has been interpreted as an argument
against the possibility of ascribing a coherent will to multimember nondictatorial deci-
sion-making bodies. See KENNETHJ. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES
46-60 (2d ed. 1963) (explaining the general possibility theorem for social welfare func-
tions). For pessimistic interpretations of the political significance of Arrow's Theorem,
see generally ALFRED F. MACKAY, ARROW'S THEOREM: THE PARADOX OF SOCIAL
CHOIcE (1980); WLAM RitER, LIBERAUSM AGAINST POPULIsM (1982).
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some other majority of legislators would have preferred a different op-
tion?"5 Because A was the option the legislators in fact jointly commit-
ted themselves to adopting as expressive of the legislative will. The
fact that some other option might have been adopted had the agenda
structure been different does not prevent option A, when adopted,
from being fully valid law. If we treat it as valid law, there is no reason
we cannot likewise treat it as expressing particular purposes, even if
some other majority would have existed for another option.
The second form of public-choice skepticism is based on the view
that legislative purpose or expression must be the aggregate effect of
that which was in the heads of individual political officeholders. Prob-
lems then grow like Topsy: legislators might have any number of pri-
vate reasons or goals in voting for legislation. Even with regard to the
public purposes they willingly avow, individual officeholders often dis-
agree. Should the government's "mental states" therefore be identi-
fied with the thought(s) in a majority of officeholders' heads, or with
those in whichever set of officeholders carried the day with respect to
a particular decision? What if the individuals comprising the decisive
group disagree among themselves about what they are enacting and
why they are enacting it This line of reasoning leads to endless co-
nundrums.ss
One way out of these difficulties is to consider legislation from the
For this form of skepticism about legislative intent or purpose, see Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CM. L. REV. 533, 547-48 (1983) ("The existence
of agenda control makes it impossible for a court-even one that knows each legisla-
tor's complete table of preferences-to say what the whole body would have done with
a proposal it did not consider in fact."). Alan Schwartz has recently argued that en-
acted legislation most often does reflect the presence of a Condorcet winner, and of-
fers this empirical fact as a solution to the problem of ascribing interpretive intent to a
legislature. But Schwartz's empirical response treats the theoretical concern as right in
theory and hence repeats a mistaken critique of legislative intent that emerges from
the public-choice literature. Even a statute that is not a Condorcet winner is treated as
fully effective law, of equal status as any other law, and rightly so. For the same reasons
that support this practice, we can just as easily adopt interpretive practices that make
that statute as coherent as possible and that interpret it according to ascribed pur-
poses. See Alan Schwartz, Statutoy Interpretation, Capture, and Tort Law: The Regulatory
ComplianceDefens 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 1, 11-16 (2000). Indeed, if one is to take Ar-
row's Theorem seriously on the question of interpretation, it probably suggests that
non-Condorcet statutes have the greatest coherence because a narrower set of legisla-
tors is responsible for them. But at a minimum, our point is that Arrow's Theorem
need not have any implication for statutory interpretation.
The extreme version of this skepticism is expressed injustice Scalia's dissenting
opinion in Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 610 (1986) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (criti-
cizing the Court for ignoring an abundantly supported legislative purpose, and instead
substituting its own notion of what "must have motivated the legislators").
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internal perspective of Congress, regarded as a plural subject or "we."
Congress has adopted various mechanisms, institutional structures,
and conventions through which it understands itself to be manifesting
its purposes. Members are deemed to have accepted these mecha-
nisms or structures by virtue of accepting their seats. Thus, members
of Congress recognize that the official reports of the substantive
committees that approve specific pieces of legislation carry the most
authoritative weight, after the text of the bill itself, in giving meaning
to proposed legislation. Similarly, Congress treats the official inter-
pretations of pending legislation offered by the bill's sponsor(s) as
particularly authoritative. Members of Congress jointly accept that
certain mechanisms are more authoritative than others for the expres-
sion of collective aims. 37 Thus, the aims of all members simply do not
count equally in understanding those collective aims.
A third public-choice inspired critique of the possibility of attrib-
uting expressive meaning to state action is that legislative acts often
reflect no more than intense interest-group deals and political com-
promises with no overarching purpose or meaning.s' This concern is
often overstated. Even when statutes contain some provisions that re-
flect compromise, this does not mean that the statute as a whole can-
not be said to reflect a coherent overall meaning and purpose.
Moreover, individuals, too, are often riven with conflict, ambivalence,
and confusion, but expressive theories of law need not ascribe any
more coherence to democratic States than the law ascribes to indi-
viduals.
These responses to public-choice skepticism about collective pur-
poses rely only on the resources internal to legislatures that entitle
them to ascribe definite purposes to their own actions. However, ex-
pressive theories of action, whether applied to individuals or groups,
do not treat agents' own conscious intentions-that is, their own un-
37 For a fuller discussion of the division of labor that generates coherence for the
legislative task, see Pildes & Anderson, supra note 1, at 2203-04. Context may deter-
mine whose interests or ideas a representative must express.
For example, at the Conference Committee stage of the legislative process,
members do not view themselves as free to pursue their own personal prefer-
ences regarding policy, or even the positions that would most favor their dis-
tricts or constituents. Instead, norms of the Conference Committee process
lead members to pursue the rationales underlying the positions of the House
or Senate, whose interests at this juncture they are expected to represent.
Id. at 2202.
s SeeEasterbrook, supra note 35, at 540 ("Almost all statutes are compromises, and
the cornerstone of many a compromise is the decision, usually unexpressed, to leave
certain issues unresolved.").
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derstandings of what they were doing in acting-as controlling the
expressive meaning of action. For purposes of constitutional assess-
ment, courts will not defer even to authentic legislative statements of
official purposes. Expressive theories have resources, beyond agents'
self-interpretations, for interpreting their purposes.
These resources are found in the public meanings of actions. On
the one hand, those engaging in expressive action can readily fail to
grasp the action's public meanings. Consider a white man who checks
into a hotel and drops his car keys into the hands of the first black
man he sees near the door. The black man is wearing a business suit
and carries a briefcase, but the white man doesn't notice; he just as-
sumes that any black man near a hotel entrance is a valet. The black
man has been insulted, notwithstanding the white man's sincere pro-
tests that he did not intend any offense. At the same time, the "re-
cipients" of actions also do not have exclusive control over the public
meanings of those actions, as legal cases frequently illustrate. In City
of Memphis v. Greene,39 for example, black residents challenged the
erection of a traffic barrier that closed off an all-white enclave to
through-going traffic that largely involved black drivers. Despite the
testimony of black residents and expert witnesses stating that these
black residents suffered significant "insult and humiliation,"4° the
Court found that the construction of the barrier did not violate the
Constitution and did not reflect a discriminatory purpose. We cannot
explore the facts fully enough here to analyze whether the Greene
holding ought to be considered correct in its actual context. But the
general principle that can be extracted from it and of which it is only
one embodiment in the law must surely be right: judgments concern-
ing whether laws create unconstitutional "stigma"4 ' are not controlled
by the experiential response of the alleged targets of those laws, even
if those judgments take such responses into account among other
considerations.
Indeed, the public meaning of an action is not even determined
by shared understandings of what the action means.4' Not long ago, it
was commonly accepted in the United States that respect permitted
men in business settings to routinely compliment their female col-
39 451 U.S. 100 (1981).
40 Id. at 140 n.3 (Marshall,J., dissenting).
41 Id. at 128.
42 This would correspond to what Adler, following Grice, calls "sentence mean-
ing"-the conventional, or commonly understood, meaning of an action. See Adler,
supra note 2, at 1393-97.
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leagues and subordinates on the way they looked. It took the feminist
movement to suggest that such behavior amounted to treating women
as if they were not serious workers, but merely sexual or aesthetic
adornments in a business scene. The habit was insulting to many
working women before people generally recognized it as such. It
could be recognized as insulting because of the ways in which it con-
tradicted norms of professional conduct that working men took for
granted among themselves (which held that neither homosexual at-
traction nor heterosexual rivalry were appropriate objects of notice in
business contexts). It could also be considered insulting because of
the ways that the practice of complimenting women workers fit into
the gendered hierarchy of labor, traditions of excluding and margi-
nalizing women from positions of responsibility, and presumptions of
male workers' entitlement to sexual gratification from their female
colleagues and subordinates.
The expressive meaning of a particular act or practice, then, need
not be in the agent's head, the recipient's head, or even in the heads
of the general public. Expressive meanings are socially constructed.
These meanings are a result of the ways in which actions fit with (or
fail to fit with) other meaningful norms and practices in the commu-
nity. Although these meanings do not actually have to be recognized
by the community, they have to be recognizable by it, if people were to
exercise enough interpretive self-scrutiny. This is the sense in which
expressive meanings are public constructions. It is not that the public
interpretation is infallible or definitive of what a practice means, but
that a proposed interpretation must make sense in light of the com-
munity's other practices, its history, and shared meanings. Thus, to
grasp the expressive meaning of an act, we try to make sense of it by
fitting it into an interpretive context.4 Contrary to some views, this
does not mean that expressive theories require that "a norm display [s]
its justification on its face. 'M The expressive meaning of a norm does
not inhere in that norm in isolation, but is a product of interpreting
the norm in the full context in which it is adopted and implemented.
All of these points apply equally well to individuals, nongovern-
mental groups, and the State. For legal interpretation, there are still
further reasons that Congress cannot be the authoritative interpreter
Cf CLIFFORD GEERz, "From the Native's Point of Vrew'" On the Nature of Anthropo-
logical Understanding, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 55, 58, 70 (2000) (arguing that under-
standing someone's mental states is "more like grasping a proverb, catching an illu-
sion, seeing ajoke" than it is like "putting oneself into someone else's skin,").
44 Kornhauser, supra note 31, at 1628.
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of its own acts. Judicial review is an institution based on suspicion
about the exercise of political power. From McCullough v. Marylant
on, courts have inquired whether publicly-articulated, legitimate pur-
poses are "pretexts"46 for other impermissible purposes that violate the
Constitution. Whether a city council sincerely believes its authoriza-
tion of religious symbols on public property does not constitute an
impermissible endorsement of religion, or whether it does aim at en-
dorsing religion but veils that aim behind the articulation of other,
public-regarding purposes, the courts will make independent judg-
ments about the ultimate legal question of endorsement.
Moreover, legal interpretation is the external attribution of mean-
ing. That attribution will reflect the purposes, as courts understand
them, of the legal order as a whole. Thus, if there are systemic rea-
sons to read a new statute, A, as if it can be integrated harmoniously
with existing statutes, B and C, courts might decide it is appropriate to
do so, whether or not the enacting legislature was even aware of the
existence of B and C. The Legal Process school of the 1950s asserted
that courts should assume that the legislature was made up of "rea-
sonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes reasonably."4 7 In the
1980s, some public-choice theorists attacked this position as lacking in
political realism. As other scholars have recognized, however, posi-
tions like these need not be offered as descriptive truisms, but rather
can be construed as presumptions that courts ought to bring to the
enterprise of interpretation for reasons that stand outside the specific
purposes and processes of the enacting legislatures4 These reasons
have to do with institutional concerns about the proper relationships
of courts and legislatures, and general systemic aims of the legal sys-
tem as a whole. Courts may use presumptions or other substantive
tools to guide the inquiry into expressive meanings. These tools will
be based upon substantive values external to the specific aims of the
enacting legislators.
For purposes of expressive conceptions of law, the democratic
State is thus both like and unlike other plural or collective subjects. It
is like them in thatjust as we can attribute purposes, beliefs, attitudes,
" 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
16 Id. at 359.
47 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SAcKs, THE LEGAL PRocEss 1378 (William N.
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994).
's Indeed, Hart and Sacks explicitly indicate the normative dimensions of their
presumptions of reasonableness. As they put it, the courts should not engage in inter-
pretation "in the mood of a cynical political observer, taking account of all the short-
run currents of political expedience that swirl around any legislative session." Id.
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and other states of mind to various plural subjects under certain con-
ditions, we can do the same for political bodies. The extreme reduc-
tionist view, which asserts that groups cannot have or express mental
states, is mistaken about what it means for groups to do so.49 To co-
herently ascribe mental states to a collective, its members must be ca-
pable of understanding themselves as expressing such mental states.
The members are not, however, the final authorities about the mean-
ings of their actions. The expressive meaning of collective actions is a
matter of public and shared meanings. Yet the democratic State is
also a distinct kind of collective. When courts attribute purposes and
expressive meaning to the State's actions, they will also do so for ex-
trinsic reasons accounting for various systemic considerations. These
further reasons reinforce the point that the expressive meaning of leg-
islation is not just a matter of the legislature's own intent. While the
process of determining the expressive meaning of any particular ac-
tion will undoubtedly be complex, there is no reason in principle that
the democratic State cannot be viewed expressively.
C. The Nature ofExpressive Harm
Expressive theories of morality and law show their distinctive
power in matters concerning expressive harms. A person suffers ex-
pressive harm when she is treated according to principles that express
negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her. Suppose some neigh-
bors cavalierly toss beer bottles onto your lawn. The ugliness of the
litter and the inconvenience of picking it up are burdens, but they are
not expressive harms. The expressive harm is in the neighbors' rude-
ness, in the casual disregard for your interests expressed in their ac-
tions. Had the bottles been blown onto the lawn by heavy winds that
knocked over the neighbors' trash can, you would still suffer the ugli-
ness and inconvenience, but not any expressive harm.
Communicative harms are a special class of expressive harms. A
49 One typical example can be found in the economically informed literature that
argues against corporate criminal responsibility or corporate "punishment" through
punitive tort damages. Thus, this literature asserts that "legal fictions cannot commit
criminal acts... [nor] can they possess mens rea, a guilty state of mind." Daniel R.
Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, Corporate Crime, 25J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 320 (1996). Similarly,
in arguing against corporate punitive damages except where necessary to provide effi-
cient incentives toward optimal levels of care, Polinsky and Shavell argue that "[t]he
notion that individuals would want to punish firms per se strikes us as not entirely dif-
ferent from the idea that individuals would want to punish inanimate objects for caus-
ing harm (such as trees that fall on people)." A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell,
Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 949 (1998).
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person suffers such a harm when she is treated according to principles
that communicate negative or inappropriate attitudes toward her-that
is, when people treat her in ways that express these attitudes, with the
intention of "sending a message" to her regarding their attitudes.
Suppose the neighbors conspicuously dump their beer bottles on your
lawn as a declaration of enmity toward you. Now their act is not
merely thoughtless, but malicious. It also constitutes an invitation, or
a dare, to establish a certain kind of social relationship with them: to
be enemies.
The communication of attitudes creates social relationships by es-
tablishing shared understandings of the attitudes that will govern the
interactions of the parties. Consider how this works in the context of
state action. A State may communicate its contempt for blacks by re-
quiring the racial segregation of public facilities. Racial segregation
sends the message that blacks are untouchable, a kind of social pollut-
ant from which "pure" whites must be protected. For the communica-
tive goal to be realized, its meaning must be acknowledged. This does
not mean that the addressees must believe, approve of, or accept the
message. They simply have to understand it. Once people share an
understanding that segregation laws express contempt for blacks,
these laws constitute blacks as an "untouchable," stigmatized caste.
Shared understandings of the attitudes governing social or politi-
cal interactions introduce conventional elements to these interactions.
Before acknowledgment by either side, state actors may have ex-
pressed their contempt for blacks in spontaneous and unselfconscious
ways. For example, white emergency rescue workers may have pre-
ferred to resuscitate white victims at mixed-race disaster scenes. After
all sides acknowledge that their relationship is governed by contempt,
the State's expressions of contempt become a language of contempt
that is governed by conventions of meaning. The spontaneous ex-
pression of disgust-avoidance-becomes stylized and regulated by
segregation laws.
This Part has argued that social relationships are constituted
through shared public understandings and meanings, which are cre-
ated through communication. This lets us grasp the special import of
expressive harms constituted by the communication of negative or un-
justified attitudes toward their victim. Communications can expressively
harm people by creating or changing the social relationships in which the ad-
dressees stand to the communicator. This can happen in two ways. First, a
communication can be expressively harmful by forcing someone to
acknowledge, and thereby enter, a disvalued relationship with the
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speaker. This kind of expressive harm is embodied in legally enforced
racial segregation.
Second, a communication, or a failure to communicate in con-
texts that demand a communicative response, can constitute a repu-
diation, retraction, or withholding of the acknowledgment of a valued
social relationship with someone else. A social relationship is consti-
tuted by a shared acknowledgment of the attitudes (and hence the
conventions for expressing them) that govern the interactions of the
parties to that relationship. Because the acknowledgment must be
shared, one party can dissolve or refuse to form the relationship by
withdrawing or withholding acknowledgment. This is why aggrieved
individuals and groups so often demand that the State acknowledge
their grievances and share their outrage at wrongs the State has in-
flicted upon them." Recognition and appropriate condemnation can,
in certain contexts, be necessary to ensure that political and social re-
lationships remain constituted according to the principles previously
thought to govern them. This is why, it seems, even token compensa-
tion makes wealthy landowners more accepting of redistribution51
Compensation, even if not commensurate with loss, expresses recog-
nition that the State is inflicting serious harm on individuals in the
service ofjustifiable ends. Nominal damages for violations of constitu-
tional rights play a similar role. 2 These and other "expressive legal
remedies" matter because they express recognition of injury and reaf-
firmation of the underlying normative principles for how the relevant
relationships are to be constituted.
We say that a person suffers an expressive harm when treated ac-
cording to a principle that expresses an inappropriate attitude toward
her. The principle may express the attitude without communicating
it, as in cases of negligent, inconsiderate, and reckless action. Even
deliberate wrongdoing can expressively harm the victim without the
actor intending to make her bad attitude an issue between her and
her victim. (Traditional deontological ethics, which stresses such dis-
tinctions of intentionality, represents one attempt to account for the
One of the first extended discussions of this as a matter of political theory is
Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALSM AND "THE POLMCS OF
RECOGNrTON" 25, 25-44 (1992).
"' See ROY L. PROSTERMAN & JEFFREY M. RIEDINGER, LAND REFORM AND
DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 194-97 (1987) (demonstrating this phenomenon in the
context of massive state land redistribution schemes across numerous countries).
52 See, e.g., Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.11
(1986) (holding that nominal damages are the appropriate remedy for violations of
constitutional rights where actual injury cannot be shown).
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different expressive harms suffered in virtue of being treated accord-
ing to different principles.)
Alternatively, the principle may express the attitude in communi-
cating it-in bringing it out in public space for acknowledgment by
the addressee. The constitutive aim of such communication is that
the attitude be publicly acknowledged as governing the interactions of
the speaker and the addressee. Successful communications of good
and bad attitudes and consequent joint orientation of action around
these shared understandings are constitutive of social relationships,
including friendship and enmity, collegiality and rivalry, and superior
and inferior caste status. In communicating our attitudes to others, or
in refusing to do so when the context demands it, we place ourselves
in social relationships or take ourselves out of such relationships.
Of course, people can also suffer nonexpressive harms to their
material and liberty interests, their psyches, and their social reputa-
tions. From an expressive point of view, these harms are also impor-
tant for the evaluation of action. But these types of harm are not sig-
nificant for the evaluation of action in the same way. They are
incommensurable: one cannot add up the expressive and the nonex-
pressive harms on the same scale and then choose the action that
minimizes total harm (or maximizes total benefit). The expressive
harm is a result of acting on an unjustified expressive principle (a
principle that expresses the wrong attitudes), while the nonexpressive
harm is a causal consequence of the action. Consideration of the two
types of harm, therefore, enters into our deliberations about what to
do at different points: the first, in ensuring that we are acting on the
right attitudes and thus on the right expressive principles; the second,
in applying those principles to the case at hand. Expressive principles
tell us to look after the nonexpressive interests of others in the right
way (respectfully, considerately, gratefully, and so forth). If we do
this, people's expressive interests will take care of themselves. In
other words, we respect people's expressive interests in acting on the
right principles (attitudes); we promote their nonexpressive interests
through acting on the right principles (attitudes). To try to put the two
types of interest on par only creates a deliberative muddle."'
Thus, even after we meet the required expressive constraints on
state action, we can be further concerned about getting the "cultural
53 This argument is highly compressed. For extended discussions, see generally
ELIzABETH ANDERSON, VALuE IN ETIcs AND EcoNoMIcs 1-90 (1993); Elizabeth An-
derson, Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods, in INcOMMENSuRABILIrY,
INcOmpARABiLnY, AND PRACTICAL REASON 90 (Ruth Chang ed., 1997).
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consequences" of public policies right. Actions that are equally con-
sistent with principles of equal concern and respect, for example,
might nonetheless have very different cultural or (more narrowly) in-
strumental effects. Policy and law certainly ought to be concerned
with these further consequences. At the same time, actions that vio-
late various expressive constraints also can have pernicious cultural or
material consequences. But expressive theories do not condemn such
actions only because of those cultural or material consequences, as this
Article will seek to demonstrate through a survey of constitutional
doctrines. If expressive theories are right, state action should be
wrong-and unconstitutional, if constitutional law tracks expressive
concems-when it expresses impermissible valuations, without regard
to further concerns about its cultural or material consequences.
III. EXPRESSiVE THEORIES OF LAW: THE EXPRESSIVE DIMENSIONS OF
CONSTrUIONAL LAW
One could try to offer an expressive theory of law (or morality) as
a comprehensive theory of legal (or moral) wrongs. Such a theory
would account for both expressive and nonexpressive harms in ulti-
mately expressivist terms. We do not attempt such an ambitious task
here. Nor can we address all the legal areas to which scholars are ap-
plying expressive theories. Instead, the remaining discussion will fo-
cus on issues of structure, equality, and rights in some exemplary areas
of constitutional law.
Expressive accounts of constitutional doctrines do not provide
easy answers, but they do orient analysis toward the right questions.
They also eliminate the conundrums that wholly consequentialist ap-
proaches generate. 5 Expressive considerations provide both a better
-1 See generally Richard H. Pildes, The Unintended Cultural Consequences of Public Policy,
89 M-cH. L. REV. 936, 939 (1991) (contending that "the cultural consequences of the
means selected to pursue... instrumental goals can undermine their realization").
'5 Larry Alexander's work, for example, consistently raises puzzles about the struc-
ture and justification of constitutional rules. In our view, these puzzles ultimately stem
from his explicit rejection of expressivist accounts of the doctrine in favor of conse-
quentialist accounts. While we do not have the space here to elaborate, we believe that
most of the problems that concern Alexander do indeed dissolve once one recognizes
the central role of expressivist considerations in constitutional doctrine. For represen-
tative works by Alexander in this vein, see Larry Alexander, Constitutional Theory and
Constitutionally Optional Benefits and Burdens, 11 CONST. CoMMENTARY 287 (1994), and
Larry Alexander, Rules, Rights, Options, and Time (Nov. 29, 1999) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the authors and the University of Pennsylvania Law Review).
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rationalization of many existing patterns of constitutional decision-
making and a better account of the theoretical purposes of the provi-
sions being enforced. This Part will argue that even where the rhe-
torical structures of justification in judicial opinions invoke
consequentialist (or functional or instrumental) language, the pat-
terns of decision are best understood in expressive terms. Just as pub-
lic discourse over certain policy issues is often carried out in conse-
quentialist language despite the fact that people's views appear
actually rooted in expressive considerations,6 so too do modern Su-
preme Court constitutional decisions often cloak expressive consid-
erations in non-expressive terms. 7
Expressive theories of constitutional law show their distinctive
power in two types of cases. The first is comprised of cases in which
laws are struck down solely on account of their expressive harms. In
these cases, the court finds that the law in question has caused no ma-
terial injuries or other objectionable harms, but nevertheless rejects
the law for expressing an unconstitutional purpose or attitude. The
second type of case occurs when several laws have similarly harmful
causal consequences, but the court rejects some of these laws while
upholding others. Because their causal consequences are the same,
the grounds for discriminating between the laws must lie elsewhere-
we shall argue, in expressive considerations.
Both types of cases arise in litigation involving the Equal Protec-
tion and Establishment Clauses. This should not be surprising, since
these are the areas scholars most often point to as best understood in
expressivist terms.-s This Article will defend a general expressivist ap-
proach to these doctrines without necessarily endorsing the Court's
applications of this approach in every case. More surprising is the
power of expressivist approaches in understanding the Constitution's
5' See generally Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 HARV. L. REV. 413
(1999) (arguing that while citizens may speak and argue in the lexicon of deterrence,
more probing analysis of policy preferences shows them to rest instead on expressive
considerations).
57 We cannot explore here why this is so. For some thoughts on this matter, see
Richard H. Pildes, Conceptions of Value in Legal Thought, 90 MCiH. L. REV. 1520 (1992)
(reviewing MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE (1990)).
'8 See, e.g., Charles R. Lawrence HI, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech
on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431, 438-57 (discussing aspects of Equal Protection cases
that can be considered expressive); Pildes & Niemi, supra note 1, at 506-16 (focusing
on the Equal Protection and Establishment Clauses in analyzing expressive harms as
constitutional injuries); Deborah Hellman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protec-
tion (Dec. 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the University of Pennsylvania
Law Review) (same).
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structural dimensions. We shall argue that expressive theories of law
make the best sense of the Dormant Commerce Clause and recent
federalism-based decisions banning congressional "commandeering"
of state officials. This analysis shows that expressive considerations
apply not only to the areas with which they are most readily associated,
such as Equal Protection, but also throughout much of American con-
stitutionalism.
A. The Equal Protection Clause
Contemporary Equal Protection doctrine incorporates expressive
concerns in at least two ways. First, it makes unconstitutional all laws
that rest on certain impermissible purposes: those that express con-
tempt, hostility, or inappropriate paternalism toward racial, ethnic,
gender, and certain other groups, or that constitute them as social in-
feriors or as a stigmatized or pariah class. 9 Second, it opposes laws
that, by giving too much weight to suspect classifications, express a di-
visive conception of citizens-a conception that represents their ra-
cial, ethnic, religious, or other parochial identities as more important
'9 The "one pervading purpose" of the Equal Protection Clause was "the protection
of the newly-made freeman and citizen from the oppressions of those who had for-
merly exercised unlimited dominion over him." The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S.
36, 71 (1872). It grants to the "colored race ... the right to exemption from un-
friendly legislation against them distinctively as colored,-exemption from legal dis-
criminations, implying inferiority in civil society." Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303, 308 (1879). The Court rejected the discriminatory administration of ordinances
regulating laundries because "no reason for it [the discriminatory administration] ex-
ists except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong." Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886). Similarly, the Court rejected the denial of a
permit to a home for the mentally retarded because "mere negative attitudes, or fear,
unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cognizable in a zoning proceeding, are
not permissible bases for treating a home for the mentally retarded differently from
apartment houses." City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448
(1985). The Court had to reject Cleburne's policy because "it rests on a bare desire to
treat the retarded as outsiders, [as] pariahs who do not belong in the community." Id,
at 473. "It is the duty of the State and its subdivisions to ensure that such forces [of
racial hostility] do not shape or control the policies of its school systems." Freeman v.
Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 490 (1992). Some cases suggest a broad principle that the State is
obligated not to act with animus toward any targets of legislative classifications. The
Court, however, has applied this principle in only a few cases. See, e.g., Romer v. Evans,
517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (striking down selective restructuring ofstate governmental
processes partly on the ground that "the amendment seems inexplicable by anything
but animus toward the class that it affects"); United States Dep't of Agric. v. Moreno,
413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("For if the constitutional conception of 'equal protection of
the laws' means anything, it must at the very least mean that a bare congressional de-
sire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental
interest.").
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than their common identity as citizens of the United States. The
Court has struck down laws expressing contemptuous, hostile, and di-
visive attitudes simply for their expressive content, without requiring
any demonstration of adverse causal consequences.6 Case law illustra-
tions of pure expressive harms are of course rare because when legis-
lators act for impermissible purposes they are not typically seeking to
do so for that sake alone, but to bring about some further set of aims.
Nonetheless, existing examples confirm that expressive harms violate
Equal Protection. The following discussion considers a few of these
examples, then explains why the Court's approach to the cases makes
sense from the expressive perspective.
The intersection of race and politics affords the richest examples.
In 1970, the city of Richmond was 52% black.61 It then undertook a
series of controversial annexations, which decreased the black popula-
tion to 42%.62 Before annexation, the city council had nine members,
all elected from the city as a whole in at-large elections.3 If voting is
racially polarized, this system makes it difficult for black voters to elect
their preferred candidates. After annexation, the Richmond City
Council was redesigned so that members were elected from individual
wards, with four heavily black-majority wards. This change meant that
black voters would have voting power proportionate to their popula-
tion even if voting remained racially polarized.64 Section 5 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act prohibits electoral changes-including annexations-
that have the "purpose [or] . . effect" of abridging the right to vote.6
In City of Richmond, the Supreme Court held that this post-annexation
structure fully complied with the requirement that there be no dis-
criminatory effect.6 As long as the post-annexation election plan re-
flected the level of black voting power, annexations would not be
treated as having any discriminatory effect.
For those who believe constitutional or statutory equality doctrine
is concerned only with material injuries, that should be the end of the
60 See supra note 59 (describing many such cases).
61 See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 363 (1975).
62 See id.
61 See id.
A fifth ward was 40.9% black in population. In the actual elections, five of the
nine seats were filled by black candidates. This is the black-majority city council that
enacted the set-aside program later held unconstitutional in City of Richmond v. JA.
Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 511 (1989).
Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 5, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 439 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) (1994)).
City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 371-72.
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matter. Yet the Court further held that, were there a discriminatory
purpose, the annexation would be invalid even if all its legal effects were
acceptable. The Court remanded the case to the lower courts to de-
termine whether Richmond had an impermissible purpose.67 The Su-
preme Court's opinion is one of the purest statements of the expres-
sive view of constitutional or statutory equality in the case law:
[I]t may be asked how it could be forbidden by § 5 to have the purpose
and intent of achieving only what is a perfectly legal result under that
section and why we need remand for further proceedings with respect to
purpose alone. The answer is plain, and we need not labor it. An official ac-
tion, whether an annexation or otherwise, taken for the purpose of dis-
criminating against Negroes on account of their race has no legitimacy at
all under our Constitution or under the statute. ... Congress surely has the
power to prevent such gross racial slurs, the only point of which is "to
despoil colored citizens, and only colored citizens, of their theretofore
enjoyed voting rights." Annexations animated by such a purpose have no cre-
dentials whatsoever, for "[a]cts generally lawful may become unlawful
when done to accomplish an unlawful end...." An annexation proved
to be of this kind and not proved to have ajustifiable basis is forbidden
by § 5, whatever its actual effect may have been or may be. 6's
Both the holding and the language through which it is justified
reveal that expressive harms in themselves are constitutional injuries.
The Court indicated concern with "gross racial slurs" and with the
"despoiling" of a group of citizens.6m This is language of offense, of in-
sult, of degradation; these are references to the character of the
State's action, not to how black voters experienced it. Notice too
how emphatic the legal conclusion is: state acts motivated by racist
purposes have "no legitimacy" and "no credentials" at all.71 Facing
one of the few laws with discriminatory purposes but no discrimina-
tory effects, the Court made clear that bad purpose in and of itself is
67 And indeed, the lower court held the action illegal because of its purpose alone.
City of Richmond, 422 U.S. at 378-79 (citations omitted) (emphasis added) (first
and second alterations added, third and fourth in original).
69 Id. at 378.
70 No proof of such psychological or cultural effects, of course, is required. Legal
rights, especially in cases involving the design of political institutions, are often as-
serted by those whose interests do not reflect the interests thatjustify recognizing the
right in the first place. The law does not, however, inquire into the "true" interest be-
hind the claim. The constitutional requirement of one-vote, one-person, for example,
is often enforced by actors with partisan political interests, not individual rights-holders
genuinely aggrieved by the purported denial of political equality. See Richard H.
Pildes, A Theory of Political Competition, 85 VA. L. REv. 1605, 1608-09 (1999) (describing
1980s one-voice, one-person cases brought to pursue partisan objectives).
71 City of Richmona; 422 U.S. at 378.
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constitutionally impeissible.7
The same conclusion is implicit in Hunter v. Underwood, in which
the Supreme Court held that the 1901 Alabama Constitution was de-
signed to restore white supremacy by disenfranchising black voters.7
In the 1980s, black and white litigants challenged the constitutionality
of provisions in the 1901 Constitution that disenfranchised those con-
victed of "crimes involving moral turpitude."74 The Court found that
the pattern of criminal disenfranchising provisions that had been in-
cluded and excluded, as well as the constitutional convention's his-
tory, justified the conclusion that this provision had been adopted for
racist purposes. The provision had a massively disproportionate racial
impact at the time adopted. However, temporal changes generated
gaps between the original purposes of the law and its actual effects,
leading to a much smaller but still significant racial impact in the pre-
sent.75 The Court unanimously held the provision unconstitutional. If
the law had no racially disproportionate impact in the present, would
the Court still have struck it down? It seems so, from the extent to
which the courts emphasized the historical materials related to origi-
nal purposes, and mentioned the continuing disparate impact only in
Just as this Article went to press, an intensely divided 5-4 Court complicated this
issue, at least with respect to interpretation of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, by
limiting City of Richmond to the specific context of annexation cases. Thus, in Reno v.
Bossier Parish School Board, the Court held that Section 5 and City of Richmond banned
State actions with respect to voting that had one kind of impermissible purpose, a "ret-
rogressive purpose," but did not ban action that had a more general discriminatory
(but non-retrogressive) purpose. 120 S. Ct. 866, 878 (2000). Having narrowly con-
strued the kind of purposes the Act made illegal, the Court did seem to continue to
recognize that State action reflecting such a purpose would be illegal, even if the ac-
tion did not have the statutorily-impermissible effect of causing retrogression of minor-
ity voting power. The Court also suggested a distinction between "denials" of the right
to vote and "abridgements" of that right; the former might continue to violate the stat-
ute when done with a discriminatory purpose, even if not a retrogressive purpose, and
even if without discriminatory effect. Id. at 877 n.6. The decision does not appear to
address directly, certainly not with any extended analysis, whether the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments require both discriminatory purpose and effect, or whether
discriminatory purpose alone violates the Constitution, as the few cases to address this
issue directly indicate. But certain passages in the Court's general formulation of the
law do suggest both are constitutionally required. See, e.g., id. at 876 ("At the time Beer
was decided, it had not been established that discriminatory purpose as well as dis-
criminatory effect was necessary for a constitutional violation .... ").
471 U.S. 222, 232 (1985) ("[W]e simply observe that its original enactment was
motivated by a desire to discriminate against blacks on account of race ... ").
4 Id.
75 Initially, the provision disenfranchised 10 times as many blacks as whites; at the
time of the litigation, the figure was 1.7 times as many blacks as whites. See id. at 227.
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passing. As Justice Holmes said, speaking of this same Alabama Con-
stitution, "[I ] t would be a new doctrine in constitutional law that the
original invalidity could be cured by an administration which defeated
their intent. "77 Certainly our view is that they should invalidate such
laws because the expressive character of state action matters without
regard to its further effects.
The most conventional expressive concerns with equal protection
doctrine involve issues of stigma and second-class citizenship. For at
least twenty-five years, constitutional doctrine has also recognized
other expressive concerns with the use of race, though these concerns
are less noticed and less emphasized by scholars. One such concern is
with the State using race too cavalierly. Another is with the State us-
ing race in an overly divisive manner or letting race play too central a
role in its decisionmaking processes.78
Consider a relatively uncontroversial example to start. Suppose a
State must ration access to gasoline during an energy crisis. It permits
some drivers to fill up on certain days, other drivers on other days.
The State might choose even and odd license plate numbers, which is
administratively convenient for gas station operators to monitor. The
State might also choose race of driver on similar grounds of adminis-
trative convenience. Such a law would be neither hostile nor stig-
matic; it neither would impose a material inequality (supposing the
State gave equal opportunities for all races to fill up) nor brand any
race as inferior. Nonetheless, it evidently is unconstitutional. Courts
would find that it fails strict scrutiny: a law justified on grounds of
administrative convenience would not meet the "pressing public ne-
cessity" prong, especially where alternative means are readily avail-
able.7 The deeper reason behind this doctrinal response would be
76 This is particularly evident in the unanimous court of appeals decision. See Un-
derwood v. Hunter, 730 F.2d 614, 618 (11th Cir. 1984) (focusing on an intent-based
analysis rather than disparate impact arguments), aff'd; 471 U.S. 222 (1985).
77 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 487 (1903). This statement is, though, ironic in the
context of Giles, for Holmes's opinion there upheld the massive and blatantly unconsti-
tutional disenfranchisement of black voters in the South. Id. at 488. For an extended
discussion of Giles and its implications for contemporary constitutional law, see Rich-
ard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Constitution, 17 CONST. COM~MNTARY
(forthcoming May 2000).
78 This answers Adler's charge that expressive views fail to recognize that nonstig-
matizing laws can also violate Equal Protection. See Adler, supra note 2, at 1436 ("[A]
stigma-based account of the Equal Protection Clause, albeit a genuine expressive ac-
count, is unpersuasive.").
7 For a discussion of administrative convenience as insufficientjustification under
strict or intermediate scrutiny, see City of Richmond v.J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469,
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that the too cavalier use of race itself raises constitutional concerns.
By highlighting, without compelling justification, the racial distinc-
tions that have historically divided us, such laws express an improperly
divisive conception of the public.
This notion of racial divisiveness does not refer to the particular
law's actual cultural effect in encouraging racialized thought and pol-
icy. The Court's incantation of themes of racial division and hostility
as effects of race-conscious laws is invariably a broad historical judg-
ment, and is not based on any specific inquiry into the actual effects of
the particular law in issue (as if that were somehow possible). As Jus-
tice O'Connor speculated in Croson, "Classifications based on
race... [u] nless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings... may
in fact... lead to a politics of racial hostility."0 Moreover, the actual
divisiveness-in-fact of particular laws and policies cannot be of talis-
manic significance. The Croson formulation itself exempts remedial
uses of race from its concerns with racially divisive laws, without inves-
tigating whether such policies in fact fan the flames of racial hostility.
We all know, however, that racial hostilities were in fact aroused by
constitutionally required desegregation orders. Thus, any fact regard-
ing the racially divisive consequences of laws is not decisive because
those facts, in and of themselves, are not what matters. Instead, any
judgments that courts may invoke about empirical effects of this sort
must be parasitic upon a prior expressive judgment that the State's
emphasis on race in a similar context makes racial divisions too sali-
ent. Those prior expressive judgments help distinguish when the divi-
sive effects of race-conscious laws will and will not be constitutionally
salient.
To clarify the expressive concern with "divisive" uses of race, con-
sider the racial redistricting cases. The Court has permitted "racial
gerrymandering "" in some contexts and denied it in others. Various
ways of describing the boundary between "appropriate and reasonably
necessary uses of race" in districting and "unjustified and excessive
uses"82 exist13 In one important formulation, when a State "subordi-
nate [s] traditional race-neutral districting principles... to racial con-
508 (1989); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690 (1973).
Croso, 488 U.S. at 493 (emphasis added).8' Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 956 (1996).
82 Id. at 995 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
83 For example, where the Voting Rights Act actually requires racial redistricting,
such redistricting does not violate the Constitution. There are obvious differences
within the five-member majority in how to approach these redistricting cases, and the
Court has not been consistent in its descriptions.
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siderations," such that racial considerations are "predominant," the
Constitution is violated.8 For example, reasonably compact districts
can be race-conscious in design, but "bizarre[ly] shape[d]" ones can-
not.8' The question of the precise harm that attended these forbidden
uses of race loomed large in these cases. In early decisions, the Court
suggested various harms that may have occurred, such as those tied to
the representational quality in these districts. In later cases, defenders
of challenged districts sought to prove that there were no such harms.
The Court, however, did not treat these empirical proofs as relevant.S86
In an earlier work, one of us characterized the harm as expressive;
the Court subsequently used this characterization to describe the
harms from excessive racial redistricting 7
The harms are expressive because they are not tied to material in-
juries to specific individuals in the same way that harms involved in
conventional individual rights cases are tied to discrete injuries. No
one's voting power is diluted by drawing these districts in a race-
conscious way. Rather, the problem is that certain districts convey the
message that political identity is, or should be, predominantly racial.
Again, this effect is a matter of the conception of political identity
(that the Court believes is) expressed through the law, and is not a
matter of what a specific district's voters actually think about their own
political identities. Even if no one accepted such a racial message, the
Court probably would reach the same constitutional result. The very
creation of these districts expresses, in the Court's view, a constitu-
tionally impermissible conception of the role of race in the design of
democratic institutions. Such an expressive view, however, is of course
not immune to factual circumstances and cultural debate. Indeed, a
large part of what we debate in politics or advocate as lawyers is what
meaning ought to be attributed to various state decisions as facts
change and cultural attitudes shift. If advocates can persuade the
Court that non-compact minority districts are integrative and do not
express inappropriate or divisive conceptions of political identity, the
Court's doctrine presumably will change.
The Bakke line between impermissible quotas and permissible
"' Miller v.Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995).
' Bush, 517 U.S. at 980.
6 See Pildes & Niemi, supra note 1, at 526-27 (arguing that Shaw and other redis-
tricting cases where "race concerns appear to submerge all other legitimate redistrict-
ing values" are "fundamentally concerned with expressive harms").
"7 See Bush, 517 U.S. at 984 (characterizing Shaw injuries as "expressive harms"); id.
at 1053 (Souter, J., dissenting) (recognizing that Shaw injuries are "probably best un-
derstood as an expressive harm").
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preferences has a similar structure and justification as the boundaries
in the racial redistricting cases.8 From a consequentialist or function-
alist point of view, this distinction seems empty. Either means-quotas
or preferences-can produce the same racial outcomes. As long as
race can be taken into account, how can the form in which it is taken
into account matter so much?
An expressive understanding of action makes it easier to see why
form can matter morally and legally. Form is not just about form for
formalism's sake. Different means of pursuing affirmative action can
express different understandings about the appropriate role of race in
public life. In Bakke, the Court was particularly concerned about the
racial reservation of places-specifically, that some opportunities were
closed to competition by members of all races, and that members of
different races were insulated from comparison with one another by
the use of separate admissions boards and standards. In the public
education context, the Court held that equality required that every-
one be able to compete on the same terms for all places.8 Race may
be a factor in university admissions, but only so long as it is treated in
the same way as other factors contributing to diversity. Applications of
the Equal Protection Clause make such differences in form important
because those differences are taken to express different understand-
ings and valuations of race.
The Equal Protection cases we have discussed manifest expressive
concerns in two ways. First, they focus on the purposes and attitudes
expressed in the law, and on the relation of race-conscious means to
ends, rather than on race-conscious means or consequences alone.
Second, they embody a distinctively expressive conception of the
harms inflicted by laws that violate the Equal Protection Clause.
These two broad expressive features of the Court's opinions are im-
portant to recognize, whether or not one agrees with their application
in specific cases.
The Court has steered a careful course between purely conse-
quentialist and rigid deontological views of equal protection. A purely
consequentialist view of equal protection would require all laws-and
only laws-with a racially differential impact of sufficient magnitude
to be struck down. While Congress has made insufficiently justified
differential racial impacts actionable in some arenas, such as in public
See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 315-19 (1978) (distin-
guishing a quota system from a preference-based system for achieving racial diversity).
89 See id. at 319 (suggesting that discrimination occurs when applicants, "[n]o mat-
ter how strong their qualifications,... are never afforded the chance to compete").
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employment and voting rights, the Court has held that racially-
differential impacts alone cannot violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth
Amendments." Differential impacts do matter, however, precisely as a
clue to expressive concerns; these impacts matter as evidence of dis-
criminatory purpose. The Court also recognizes that laws with invidi-
ous purposes but with no demonstrable differential impact can be un-
constitutional, as City of Richmond shows.9' Moreover, the Court treats
policies with the same differential impact differently, on grounds of
their form, because it concludes that different forms of race-
consciousness can express more or less acceptable conceptions of the
proper role of race in society. This is the linchpin of Bakke.
92
Under a rigid deontological view of equal protection, the Court
might strike down all race-conscious means to state ends. This view,
that the Constitution should be "color-blind," is an example of what
we might label "vulgar deontology." The Court, however, has rejected
the position that the bare use of racial classifications is inherently and
therefore always unconstitutional. Racial classifications are justifiably
used to undo prior unconstitutional uses of race, as in school deseg-
regation,93 public employment,94 and voting rights cases.95 The evalua-
tion of laws that classify by race depends not on the bald fact of its use,
but on the purposes for which the classification is used.
See City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 65-80 (1980) (holding that an at-large
electoral system does not violate the Fifteenth Amendment just because it has a dis-
proportionate racial impact); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 (1976) (holding
that a facially neutral law is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially dispro-
portionate impact). While these cases are consistent with an expressive view, expres-
sive theories would not require these rulings. We do not agree with the application of
the purpose test in these specific cases. An expressive theory could hold, for example,
that some differential racial impacts of state policies with regard to vital group interests
are so severe as to license the inference that only a State grossly indifferent to the fate
of that group could tolerate them. The theory would then require a holding that ac-
tions that express gross indifference to the interests of a racial group are unconstitu-
tional.
9' See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (explaining that administrative
convenience is an unconstitutionaIjustification for a classification).
9 438 U.S. at 315.
9s See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971)
(holding a state law forbidding use of race in school assignments unconstitutional);
McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41-42 (1971) (holding a race-conscious assignment of
students to public schools constitutional).
9' See United States v. Paradise, 480 U.S. 149, 185-86 (1987) (holding a race-
conscious state trooper promotion requirement constitutional).
'- See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 985 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (arguing
that racial redistricting cases hold unconstitutional the "unnecessary and excessive gov-
ernmental use and reinforcement of racial stereotypes" (emphasis added)).
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Thus, the Court has consistently held that equal protection cannot
be applied by looking at the means or consequences of laws alone.
One must also examine the law's expressive purposes and thejustifica-
tory connection between its means and ends. Racial classification is
wrong either when it is used for impermissible ends-those that ex-
press hostile, contemptuous, or other unjustified "negative atti-
tudes"96-or when the Court concludes there is gratuitious, divisive, or
excessive reliance on racial means for permissible ends. Such reliance
expresses a conception of racial identity as having the wrong kind of
role in public affairs, even if public policies are permissibly race con-
scious to some extent. Such a focus on the expressive content of ends
and on the connection between means and ends is, as we have shown
above, the touchstone of an expressive theory of action.
Second, the Court recognizes the distinctive character of expres-
sive harms as harms inherent in the principle on which the laws are
enacted, rather than in the causal consequences of the laws. Policies
adopted out of contempt or hostility toward a racial group, or with the
purpose of branding a racial group as inferior, are expressively harm-
ful and therefore unconstitutional regardless of their direct material,
social, and psychological consequences. For example, the harm from
racial segregation does not lie simply in its material consequences. As
parts of the opinion in Brown recognized,97 "[s]eparate educational fa-
cilities are inherently unequal,",8 "even though the physical facilities
and other 'tangible' factors may be equal" in white and black public
schools." There is thus also an independent expressive harm, which
we would call a "stigmatic" harm.
One could argue that "stigma" refers to the causal consequences
of laws violating equal protection-that is, their tendency to damage
their target's self-esteem-rather than to the fact that stigmatizing
laws communicate a message of inferiority. In favor of this view, critics
of expressivism could cite the Brown Court's notorious reliance on so-
cial scientific evidence that racial segregation "generates a feeling of
inferiority" in black children's minds.00 This reliance, however, was
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985) ("[M] ere
negative attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cogniza-
ble... are not permissible bases for [discrimination].").
Brown v. Board of Education can be read as offering several different accounts of
what was wrong with segregation, including this expressive account. For a detailed
reading that takes a similar tack on expressive meanings, see Hellman, supra note 58.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (emphasis added).
Id. at 493.
10 Id. at 494.
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short-lived. In the series of summary affirmances after Brown, the
Court held segregation unconstitutional in every public space, includ-
ing parks, swimming pools, buses, beaches, and golf courses,1' without
any purported proof of the types of cultural or personal effects ges-
tured at in Brown's famous footnote.1 Similarly, in striking down
state anti-miscegenation laws, the Court focused exclusively on the
laws' history and meaning, not on their specific cultural or psycho-
logical effects.'03
This doctrinal approach surely seems right the State is not justi-
fied in heaping indignities on people just because they can "take it."
In their cultural context, segregated schools were unequal in them-
selves, independent of their material effects. Given that the Court has
consistently rejected the view that racial classifications per se violate
equal protection,'" the only logical alternative interpretation of this
declaration is expressive: racially segregated educational facilities are
inherently unequal because they embody a message of inferiority or
an attitude of contempt or hostility. This conclusion is correct both as
a matter of law and of morality. To insist that what is wrong about ac-
tions that communicate bad attitudes toward others is the psychologi-
cal trauma they inflict on their addressees is to hold that only the thin-
skinned and psychologically fragile are entitled to be treated with dig-
nity." We reject the view that no harm results from trying to humili-
'' See, e.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903, 903 (1956) (invalidating segregation on
buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879, 879 (1955) (invalidating segregation
on golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v.Dawson, 350 U.S. 877, 877 (1955) (invalidating
segregation on beaches).
10 Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11 (citing authorities describing psychological effects
of segregation).
"*' See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) ("The fact that Virginia prohibits
only interracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifi-
cations must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White
Supremacy."). For an interesting justification of the Brown Court's reliance on evi-
dence of actual harm and the LovingCourt's disregard of such evidence, seeJohn Hart
Ely, If At First You Don't Succeed, Ignore the Question Next Time? Group Harm in Brown v.
Board of Education andLoving v. Virginia, 15 CONsT. COMMENTARY 215 (1998).
'o See, e.g., Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 993 (1996) (O'ConnorJ., concurring) (not-
ing that States may intentionally create majority-minority voting districts and "may oth-
erwise" take race into consideration without triggering strict scrutiny, "so long as [the
State] do [es] not subordinate traditional districting criteria to the use of race for its
own sake or as a proxy"); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291
(1978) (recognizing that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions are inherently suspect and
thus call for the most exactingjudicial examination," but not "all such restrictions are
unconstitutional" (citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944))).
105 This position also threatens to turn equal protection doctrine into a subjective
test, as if individuals could prove that a law is unconstitutional just by showing that it
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ate another person, so long as one does not succeed. Action taken
with the purpose of humiliation is an expressive harm in itself.
Alternatively, one could argue that a law becomes stigmatizing as a
result of its impact on public perceptions of the targets of the law-
that is, its tendency to lower the social standing of those the State
brands as inferiors. According to this view, a law communicating a
message of inferiority would not be objectionable if citizens at large
106
rejected that message. This misses the point, however, that legal
communications of status inferiority constitute their targets as second-
class citizens. The view only makes sense if one fails to recognize that
the democratic State consists of citizens acting collectively through
their representatives. Or, at the least, the democratic State consists of
state officials acting collectively to express the lower regard the State
has for the targets of a stigmatizing law. If it is wrong for individuals
acting on their own to treat certain social groups as inferior, it is also
wrong for citizens acting collectively to do so.1° '
In our view, equal citizenship status in a legitimate State is a sig-
nificant objective good for human beings. Adler has offered no rea-
son to think that, among all expressive relations individuals could
have to others, the relations they have to their fellow citizens acting
collectively through the State are uniquely irrelevant to their welfare.
In addition, Adler's alternative view-that the State's communications
matter only for their effects on people's subjective feelings or social
status-leads to unacceptable implications. It implies that there is
nothing wrong with the State heaping indignities on the thick-
skinned. It implies that the validity of state laws should be held hos-
tage to the self-esteem of the hypersensitive. It implies that blacks
makes them feel bad about themselves. Such a test would hold the constitutionality of
laws hostage to the feelings of the hypersensitive. Whether the feelings of inferiority
induced by a law are constitutionally relevant ought instead to depend on a prior
judgment of whether the law is expressively objectionable in itself.
16 Adler argues this point. SeeAdler, supra note 2, at 1431, 1434-36.
107 Adler's attempt to deny the welfare impact of expressive harms that the State
inflicts is puzzling. Adler correctly notes that there is a distinction between legal and
social status. The attitudes known to govern particular persons' relations to the State
(citizens acting collectively), may differ from the attitudes that govern these persons'
relations toward citizens acting as individuals or as members of private groups (for ex-
ample, firms). This fact, however, hardly indicates that only social status, not legal
status, is relevant to people's welfare. A comparable assertion would be that blacks
should not object to being segregated injury boxes unless such segregation leads res-
taurant owners to segregate them as well. But this assertion would be so strange that it
makes us wonder whether we are reading Adler correctly surely blacks' struggles for
equality of citizenship matter in themselves, beyond any effects their citizenship status
has on their treatment by people acting in their private capacities.
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should not mind segregation in their City Hall unless such segregation
causes private individuals to degrade them in similar ways. And it im-
plies that illegitimate States have a moral license to treat some of their
citizens with contempt.
One might object that our insistence that stigmatizing laws can in-
flict expressive harms apart from the psychological trauma or reputa-
tional damage they cause is like insisting that the proverbial tree fal-
ling in the forest makes a sound even if no one hears it. We do not
suppose that laws that communicate messages of inferiority generally
fall on deaf ears, or on no ears at all. Rather, we hold that the expres-
sive harm of communicative acts can be realized simply by people un-
derstanding the degrading message, not only by people accepting, in-
ternalizing, or endorsing that message. A target of the message may
manifest her grasp of it through indignant defiance, and non-
targeted, ympathetic observors might share her indignation. This
does not make the message any less offensive.0 s In other cases, people
can suffer expressive harms of which they are unaware by being de-
nied standing in certain relationships without their knowledge. For
example, the expressive harm of adultery is not found in the knowl-
edge that one has been betrayed, nor in others' knowledge of this be-
trayal, but in the very fact of betrayal itself. Similarly, the expressive
harm embodied in the State regarding its citizens in primarily racial
terms does not consist in anyone knowing this, but simply from the
fact that by so regarding citizens, the State denies them the primacy of
their common identity as fellow citizens.
B. The Establishment Clause
The Establishment Clause is another constitutional arena in which
expressive accounts have become central to both doctrine and schol-
arship.1o' We do not attempt to offer a comprehensive expressive ac-
'0 One might think that feelings of indignation or offense are psychologically
harmful in and of themselves. This would be an error. Feelings of indignation or of-
fense are typically expressions of great self-regard. Theyalso can be empowering. The
objects of our indignation, however-the things we are indignant or offended about-
are harmful. They are always expressive harms.
'0 Adler rightly notes this. See Adler, supra note 2, at 1438. The central manifesta-
tion of expressivist approaches is the "no endorsement" test, discussed extensively infra
text accompanying notes 127-29. For two important criticisms of this test, see Michael
W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHm. L. REV. 115, 147-57 (1992);
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal illusions: Establishment Neutrality and
the 'No Endorsement" Test 86 MICH. L. REV. 266 (1987). We cannot undertake a re-
sponse here to these critiques, although many of Smith's arguments rest on premises
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count of the Establishment Clause, nor do we endorse all of the
Court's applications of expressive views to particular cases. Neverthe-
less, it is clear that Establishment doctrine has been powerfully shaped
by a concern to define the appropriate attitude of the State toward re-
ligion. The Court has attempted to steer a course between laws that
express hostility to religion, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause,110
and laws that endorse religion, in violation of the Establishment
Clause." The middle road is one in which the State takes the appro-
priate expressive stance toward religion."2
As discussed below, all the hallmarks of an expressive theory are
present in Establishment doctrine. First, the doctrine prohibits state
infliction of purely expressive harms, even when unaccompanied by
similar to Adler's, and we do respond to a central confusion between communication
and expression that we believe Smith shares with Adler. See infra note 185.
110 Thus, in Illinois ex reL McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 211 (1948),
the Court claimed that any state actions that "manifest a governmental hostility to re-
ligion" would violate the Free Exercise Clause. In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312
(1952), the Court, while affirming the separation of church and state, rejected the
claim that the State may not release students during school hours for voluntary unsub-
sidized religious instruction, on the grounds that such an interpretation of the Estab-
lishment Clause would render state and religion "aliens to each other-hostile, suspi-
cious, and even unfriendly." In Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984), the Court
declared that the Constitution "[a]ffirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions," because "anything less" would express "callous indifference"
toward the religious.
" "The symbolic union of church and state inherent in the provision of secular,
state-provided instruction in the religious school buildings threatens to convey a mes-
sage of state support for religion to students and to the general public." School Dist. v.
Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 397 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997)
(overruling Ball's holding, but not the principle of neutrality upon which it was based,
so that the State's conveyance of a message of state support for religion is still unconsti-
tutional). The State's endorsement of prayer activities at the beginning of each school
day is "not consistent with the established principle that the government must pursue a
course of complete neutrality toward religion." Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 60
(1985). Although, in refining the definition of governmental action that unconstitu-
tionaly "advances" religion, the Court's subsequent decisions have variously spoken in
terms of
"endorsement," "favoritism," "preference," or "promotion,"the essential prin-
ciple remains the same. The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits
government from appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief
or from "making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community."
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at
687) (O'Connor, J., concurring)).
.. One description of the appropriate expressive stance is the following: "while
protecting all, it prefers none, and disparages none." Minor v. Board of Educ. (Ohio
Super. Ct., Feb. 1870) (Op. of Taft,J., dissenting), reu', 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872). This
opinion is not reported, but is quoted in SchoolDistrict of Abington Township v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963).
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differential causal impact between adherents and nonadherents of a
religion. Second, far from treating laws with the same effects equally,
it treats certain effects as of constitutional concern only when they are
caused by a law already found objectionable on expressive grounds.
Third, Establishment doctrine clearly distinguishes the expressive
meaning of state action from what state actors intended to communi-
cate, and holds the State accountable for the former. Fourth, it rec-
ognizes how the State's communications can expressively harm people
by changing their relationship to the State.
We will now explore each of these issues in greater depth below.
State infliction of purely expressive harms, as manifested in sectar-
ian creche displays on public property (which involve no significant
material aid to religion or differential material impact between adher-
ents and nonadherents) are unconstitutional."" This should not be
surprising given that the State's concern in these cases mirrors its
concern in Equal Protection doctrine cases: namely that, in endors-
ing a particular message, the State may affect "a person's standing in
the political community."114 As Justice O'Connor, the Justice who is
most responsive in general to the expressivist perspective, powerfully
stated: "Endorsement sends a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an ac-
companying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite
message."1
Whether state action actually makes nonadherents feel like pariahs
is irrelevant. Justice O'Connor writes, "The relevant issue is whether
an objective observer... would perceive [the action] as a state en-
dorsement of [religion] .116 The focus on objective observers rather
than actual observers indicates that the endorsement inquiry is about
the objective meaning of the State's message, and not about its subjec-
tive psychological effects. This focus is proper, because the constitu-
tionality of state laws cannot be held hostage to observers' subjective
feelings. A subjective perspective would make adjudication impossible
because people could claim to feel like an outsider, either as a result of
the State's aiding or as a result of its not aiding, religion." People's
"- See County of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 621 (holding that a Roman Catholic Nativity
scene in front of a county courthouse violates the Establishment Clause).
114 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
"' Id. at 688.
116 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 76 (O'ConnorJ., concurring).
17 It is no wonder the Court has been careful to insist that, no matter what adher-
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psychological reactions to a law matters in the context of constitu-
tional challenges only when their reactions are based on an "objec-
tively" valid understanding of the law's expressive meaning.
Justice O'Connor's concern about the message sent by state in-
volvement in religious matters is also (properly) not related to the cul-
tural impact of state expression. Her concern is not related to
whether the State persuades citizens to personally accept such mes-
sages, and thereby influences these citizens to regard nonadherents as
outsiders. Citizens acting together through the State are already re-
garding nonadherents as outsiders when they endorse religion. This
collective action in itself constitutes a change in the citizenship status
of nonadherents, whether or not citizens individually believe such a
change is justified. Citizenship is a legal status, not a matter deter-
mined by the individual opinions prevalent in the culture. Laws can-
not raise or lower citizenship because of how people subjectively re-
spond to them. A law can do so only by virtue of the standing of
citizens created in or expressed through the law itself.
The Court's concern with the effects of state legislation regarding
religion depends on the Court's background judgments about the ex-
pressive meaning of the legislation in question. The case law promi-
nently mentions two possible effects of such legislation: the risk of
generating political divisiveness along religious lines, and the conse-
quence of advancing religion. Consider first the possibility that state
actions regarding religion could inflame religious divisiveness." 8 The
Court has worried that state aid to parochial schools could inspire citi-
zens to identify themselves primarily along religious lines, to regard
those not belonging to their religion as antagonists, and thereby to
submerge their common identities as U.S. citizens in favor of religious
self-identifications. This would divert them from "the myriad [secu-
lar] issues and problems that confront every level of government," and
inhibit their willingness to work together on political matters of com-
119
mon concern.
ents to religion may feel about the issue, their claim that the State's refusal to aid relig-
ion expresses hostility toward religion is unwarranted. See, e.g., Illinois ex reL. McCollum
v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 211-12 (1948) ("To hold that a state cannot consis-
tenty with the First and Fourteenth Amendments utilize its public school system to aid
any or all religious faiths... does not... manifest a governmental hostility to religion
11 "When government.., allies itself with one particular form of religion, the in-
evitable result is that it incurs 'the hatred, disrespect and even contempt of those who
held contrary beliefs.'" School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
221-22 (1963) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962)).
" Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 623 (1971).
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Yet there is a fundamental asymmetry in the Court's treatment of
the divisive consequences of a law and its expressive meaning. In
Wallace v. Jaffree, the Court invalidated an Alabama statute providing
for a period of "meditation or voluntary prayer" in public schools on
the grounds that its purpose was to encourage prayer. However, the
Court asserted that a statute providing for a period of meditation
would be constitutional if its purpose was neutral between religious
and nonreligious uses of that period. Thus, the Court held that a sec-
tarian purpose alone-that is, the expressive meaning of an act
alone-could invalidate an otherwise permissible meditation statute.
By contrast, "political divisiveness alone [cannot serve] to invalidate
[otherwise permissible] government conduct."2 The Court does not
want to allow litigious parties to have their way simply by virtue of the
fact that they have picked a fight over an Establishment claim, thereby
demonstrating its divisiveness.123 More tellingly, O'Connor argued
that the political divisiveness of a state action concerning religion is at
best evidence of state endorsement of religion, and not an independent
ground for invalidating the action. "[T]he constitutional inquiry
should focus ultimately on the character of the government activity
that might cause such divisiveness, not on the divisiveness itself."'24
Her analysis mirrors this Article's argument for understanding the
significance of the psychological or cultural impact of a law, and is ex-
actly what an expressivistview calls for.
The Lemon test requires that a statute's "principal or primary ef-
fect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion."'25 This
looks like a consequentialist test. Justice O'Connor has persuasively
argued, however, that a pure effects test makes no sense in light of Es-
tablishment Clause case law. Many laws that the Court has held con-
stitutional, such as the exemption from taxes of religious organiza-
12 Wallace, 472 U.S. at 43 ("Apart from the purpose to return voluntary prayer to
public school, Senator Holmes unequivocally testified that he had 'no other purpose
in mind.'").
121 See i. at 56 ("[T]he enactment [of the voluntary prayer act] was not motivated
by any clearly secular purpose-indeed, the statute had no secular purpose... ").
'2 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668,684 (1984).
12 See i. ("A litigant cannot, by the very act of commencing a lawsuit.., create the
appearance of divisiveness and then exploit it as evidence of entanglement.").
124 Id. at 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
'2' Lemon v. Kutzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971); see also Board of Educ. v. Allen,
392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) ("If [the primary effect of the statute] is the advancement or
inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of legislative power as cir-
cumscribed by the Constitution.") (quoting School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963)).
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tions, and Sunday closing laws, have had a "primary effect" of advanc-
116ing religion. Instead, "What is crucial is that a government practice
not have the effect of communicating a message of government en-
dorsement or disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that
effect, whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion rele-
vant, in reality or public perception, to status in the political commu-
nity. 
1 27
In this passage, O'Connor clearly marks the distinction we have
stressed between expressive and communicative (intended) meaning.
A state action can unintentionally send a message of endorsement be-
cause of what the act means-that is, because of the attitudes and
opinions it perhaps unwittingly manifests.
The expression of such meanings is important because it can
change a person's status in the political community. As we have ar-
gued, social relations are partially constituted by mutual acknowledg-
ment of the terms on which people are relating to one another. This
implies that a failure to express certain meanings in contexts where such
expressions are demanded can constitute a withdrawal of the acknowl-
edgment to which people are entitled, and thereby can redefine the
social relations constituted by the mutual acknowledgement.
For example, by encouraging the placement of exclusively Chris-
tian religious symbols on public property during the Christmas sea-
son, state legislators might intend to communicate nothing more than
collective joy for the time of year. The ordinance permitting these
placements might even say: "To communicate our collective celebra-
tion of Christmas, we hereby authorize the placing of the following
symbols in the city square." Their action, however, manifests their ex-
clusive conception of the "wee" with whom they are collectively cele-
brating. "We" includes only Christians. Non-Christians do not par-
ticipate in "our" collective celebration, and thus are excluded from
the legislators' conception of who "we" are. The legislators fail to ac-
knowledge the insider status of non-Christians in a context that de-
mands such acknowledgment, and thereby withdraw from non-
Christians the social status of fully-included citizens.
Expressivist analysis properly dominates the parts of Establishment
doctrine that perform the same function for religious differences
among citizens that Equal Protection doctrine performs for racial and
ethnic differences among citizens. The Court's longstanding concern
126 Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O'ConnorJ, concurring).
127 Id. (emphasis added).
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about excessive state entanglement with religion indicates that Estab-
lishment doctrine serves other purposes as well. We do not claim that
expressivist analysis has equivalent analytic power to make sense of
this vexed area of law.128 However, even in the core areas where we be-
lieve expressivist theories of law make best sense of doctrine, Adler in-
sists that expressivist concerns are misplaced. What about governmen-
tal endorsements of religion that have no cultural effects because
citizens ascribe no authority to the government or ignore the meaning
of its actions? In that case, he asserts, " [t] the expressivist must either
insist on counting that statement [the endorsement] as a distinctive
moral wrong, notwithstanding its cultural irrelevance, or she is no
longer an expressivist.f For us, this is not a difficult question. The
short answer is that we do count such endorsements as distinctive
moral wrongs. Could constitutional law possibly do otherwise?
C. The Dormant Commerce Clause
In constitutional law, the provisions conventionally thought most
likely to involve expressive considerations are the Establishment and
Equal Protection Clauses. We believe that the expressive perspective
extends well beyond these domains to structural features of the Con-
stitution. Issues of national power vis-a-vis the States, and of relation-
ships between States, are also best understood expressively. Expressiv-
ism thereby transcends the standard divide between structural issues
and issues of rights or equality. Although it would be foolhardy to
claim that any one perspective could unify all constitutional doctrines,
constitutional practice is pervasively more oriented toward expressive
considerations than is generally recognized. This Part illustrates this
point by offering an expressive view of the Dormant Commerce
Clause. The next Part proposes an expressive account of federalism.
Historically, the most important role of the Supreme Court has
not been the (peculiarly post-World War II) task of protecting rights
and equality. It has been to define the structural boundaries of the
distribution of governmental powers between various institutions. In
particular, the Court constrains state legislation that interferes unduly
with national powers.!
12 Michael McConnell's critique of the endorsement test acknowledges that the
test might be most apt for cases in which the only effect on religion of state action is
symbolic. SeeMcConnell, supra note 109, at 155-56.
12' Adler, supra note 2, at 1448.
ISO As Justice Holmes famously observed early in the 20th century "I do not think
the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act of Con-
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Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine addresses constitutional
limitations on the powers of States to regulate in ways that interfere
unduly with the interstate market. To the Framers, the paradigmatic
examples of state regulations infringing on the national commerce
power included tariffs and embargoes on out-of-state goods, as well as
the retaliatory state laws that tariffs, embargoes, and similar laws often
triggered. If any doctrine might be thought grounded in purely con-
sequentialist or welfare-maximizing considerations, the Dormant
Commerce Clause would be. Even here, however, at the core of the
commercial-affairs Constitution, constitutional doctrine is best ration-
alized and understood on expressive grounds.
Recall the possibilities the Court has explored for determining
limits on state regulation of interstate commerce. At certain times,
the Court sought to define mutually exclusive spheres of state and na-
tional authority over interstate commerce by differentiating function-
ally between activities that were "inherently" local from those that
were "inherently" national. 3 ' The commercial integration wrought by
transformations in communications, transportation, and technology,
however, made this boundary increasingly elusive and nonfunctional.
At other times, the Court tried to characterize the purposes behind
state laws, aiming to invalidate those that had a "commercial" purpose
rather than a purpose to protect health, safety, or welfare.1' The arti-
ficial nature of distinguishing commercial from welfare purposes
eventually undermined this approach. At still other times, the Court
distinguished state laws that "directly" rather than "indirectly" affected
interstate commerce. 33 Absent a theory of how to classify effects as ei-
ther direct or indirect, however, no such line could be intelligibly ap-
plied.
gress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make that decla-
ration as to the laws of the several States." O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS
295-96 (1920).
Il1 For a summary of these approaches and the associated cases, see GEOFFREY R.
STONE ET AL., CONSTrfUTIONAL LAw 290-93 (3d ed. 1996). See also Barry Friedman,
Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 317, 328-38 (1997) (explaining the evolution of
the Court's interpretation of Congress's power to regulate commerce). For the classic
exposition of 19th-century constitutional practice as organized around the definition
of mutually exclusive spheres of power, see Duncan Kennedy, Toward a Historical Un-
derstanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-
1940, 3 RES. L. & Soc 8, 14-17 (1980).
" See STONE ET AL., supra note 131, at 290 (discussing cases in which the Court de-
termined the validity of state statutes by looking at the purpose for which they were
enacted).
133 See id. at 291 (discussing cases in which state statutes were invalidated for "di-
rectly" regulating interstate commerce).
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In the modem period, the Court abandoned the mutually exclu-
sive spheres approach and adopted the position that States and Con-
gress had concurrent authority to regulate interstate commerce. But
what limits should bound the scope of state regulation of national
markets, and for what reasons? Supreme Court language often sug-
gests that the Court should engage in consequentialist calculations
about the effects of state laws and then "balance" these effects to de-
termine if the state law is welfare-maximizing. The canonical formula-
tion of Pike v. Bruce Church states: "Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless
the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation
to the putative local benefits."3 In an oft-cited article, Noel Dowling
has explained this position as holding that a state law is unconstitu-
tional if the burdens it imposes on interstate commerce outweigh the
local benefits it generates."" As the doctrine developed, the Court re-
peatedly recited the language of Pike and frequently invoked the im-
agery of balancing. 6 If balancing were the real basis for these deci-
sions, the doctrine would rest on adjudicating the costs and benefits of
state laws to the interstate and local markets and would thus reflect
the kind of consequentialist reasoning that some scholars believe se-
verely determines constitutional doctrine.
However, as Donald Regan has demonstrated in a series of mana-
gerial articles, the modem Court's decisions are best rationalized as
turning on whether the state law manifests the protectionist purpose
of improving the competitive position of in-state economic actors at
the expense of their out-of-state competitors.1 37 Regan shows that the
decisions in the last decade have become increasingly clear on this
principle and correspondingly less likely to invoke the "balancing"
114 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
' See Noel T. Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REV. 1, 19-28
(1940) (advocating the balancing approach to cases involving restrictions on interstate
commerce).
156 See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994)
(quoting the Pike balancing test); Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,
442 (1978) (same); Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 804 (1976)
(same).
137 See Donald H. Regan, The Supreme Court and State Protectionism: Making Sense of
the Dormant Commerce Clause; 84 MIcH. L. REv. 1091, 1094-98 (1986) (defining "protec-
tionism" as it relates to the Dormant Commerce Clause). Regan's precise definition
also includes the requirement that the law be "analogous in form to the traditional in-
struments of protectionism-the tariff, the quota, or the outright embargo." Id. at
1095.
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rhetoric characteristic of effects-based doctrines.'3 Regan argues that
the Court's practice, when understood as preventing protectionism by
the States, best reflects the Constitution's original purposes and struc-
tural features."9 The interesting question involves why constitutional
boundaries on state power should turn on protectionist purposes.
Why, from among all the state laws that burden the interstate market,
are only those with protectionist purposes constitutionally forbidden?
The principal reason is that protectionist state laws are distinctly
"inconsistent with the very idea of political union, even a limited fed-
eral union,"'40 that informs the American constitutional structure. As
Regan puts it, protectionist legislation is "hostile in its essence."'4 1 As
we would put it, protectionist legislation expresses a constitutionally
impermissible attitude toward the interests of other States in the po-
litical union. The harm inflicted on out-of-state interests is not a by-
product of otherwise legitimate aims, but rather is directly intended as
a mechanism through which to enhance local economic well-being.
State A takes economic product from State B producers and gives it to
State A producersjust because they are in State A. "Such behavior has
no place in a genuine political union of any kind."142 The idea of po-
litical union is constituted by a set of normative understandings con-
cerning the relationship among States. States have considerable
power, concurrent with the federal government, to affect interstate
economic affairs. The power to act for reasons that express an an-
tagonistic conception of state self-interest reflected in protectionist
legislation, however, remains off-limits. Structural boundaries on state
power are thus defined in expressive terms.
Of course, bad consequences can be expected to flow from pro-
tectionist state legislation. Protectionist laws tend to promote politics
of divisiveness. Legislation that expresses State A's hostility to State
'- See Donald H. Regan, Movement of Goods Under the Dormant Commerce
Clause and the European Community Treaty 9-12 (undated) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with authors and the University of Pennsylvania Law Review) (arguing that,
since 1986, decisions have become even clearer in emphasizing protectionist purposes
over balancing).
'3' See Regan, supra note 137, at 1124-25 (arguing that the main point of the grant
of power to Congress to regulate commerce was to "disable states from regulating
commerce among themselves").
140 Id, at 1113.
,41 Id.; see also Great Ad. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 879-81 (1976)
(striking down a mandatory reciprocity provision of a Louisiana law for being"'hostile
in conception as well as burdensome in result'" (quoting Polar Ice Cream & Creamery
Co. v. Andrews, 875 U.S. 361, 877 (1964))).
142 Regan, supra note 137, at 1113.
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B's interests is perhaps most likely, as an empirical matter, to generate
cycles of resentment and retaliation among other States. Individual
cases, however, do not require proof of concrete hostile reception and
retaliatory effects of this sort. To require such a response would be
perverse, as already seen in the Establishment Clause analysis. The
very purpose of constitutional litigation is to encourage peaceful legal
relief rather than actual regulatory retaliation. The Court has prop-
erly denied States the defense of justified retaliation for their own
protectionist laws. Instead, the Court has required States to seek legal
relief.143 The determination of constitutional boundaries thus cannot
rest on the actual divisive effects of state economic regulation.
Similarly, protectionist state laws can be seen as inefficient be-
cause they divert business from low-cost producers without the justifi-
cation of a legitimate national benefit.144 Constitutional doctrine,
however, is hardly concerned with guarding against inefficient state
legislation. States validly enact many laws that burden the interstate• 45
market and that are inefficient from an economic perspective. Two
points must be made here about the relationship between expressive
considerations and consequences. First, expressivist constitutional
doctrines are not inattentive to more tangible, concrete, or instru-
mental consequences. The Constitution embodies the idea of politi-
cal union because the Framers thought that this principle would gen-
erate a "better" union in several senses. Second, however, these ideas
and expressive considerations determine which bad consequences
raise constitutional concerns. Inefficient state laws are not unconsti-
tutional because they are inefficient. Rather, they are unconstitu-
tional when they result from legislation to which courts ascribe a pro-
tectionist purpose. Thus, even with respect to issues of constitutional
structure, a principal doctrine rests on expressive considerations.
In refuting expressive foundations for constitutional doctrines,
some argue that judicial judgments of legislative purpose will be too
arbitrary and indeterminate. 146 To be sure, such judgments will not be
'43 See Great Atlantic, 424 U.S. at 375-81 (holding that a retaliatory measure "unduly
burden[ed] the free flow of interstate commerce" and could not be "justified as a
permissible exercise of any state power").
14 See Regan, supra note 137, at 1124 (objecting to protectionist legislation because
of its inefficiency).
1'5 One striking example is Maryland's ban, enacted in the wake of the 1970s en-
ergy crisis, on vertically integrated oil producers owning retail gasoline stations in the
State. SeeExxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 119-20 (1978) (describ-
ing the Maryland statute).
116 Adler repeats this concern. See Adler, supra note 2, at 1389-93 (discussing the
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mechanical. The balancing tests suggested by Pike, however, are even
harder to apply. How should courts balance local economic benefits
against burdens on interstate commerce, given that the benefits might
be environmental-, safety-, or health-oriented, while the burdens are
economic? Even if this problem could be solved, one ought to won-
der why judges would be particularly good at the complex cost and
benefit calculations required by consequentialist balancing. As Regan
has observed, if there is anything judges would be thought to have ex-
pertise about, it would be the attribution of purposes to political ac-
tors, not these exquisitely complex consequentialist calculations.147
D. Federalism
The more courts understand the Constitution's deep structural
features and its rights and equality provisions in expressivist terms, the
more compelling the case becomes that constitutional law is perva-
sively oriented to expressivist, rather than to consequentialist, welfare-
maximizing, or functional concerns. Further, we suggest that expres-
sive considerations play a major role in explaining current constitu-
tional constraints on national power vis4-vis the States, specifically the
power to "commandeer" state officials. This proposition requires
more speculation, for the Supreme Court has only recently, and only
in two cases to date, announced and enforced these federalism-based
constraints. The shape and justification of the doctrines, therefore,
remains uncertain. Our point is not to endorse these recent deci-
sions, but to suggest that expressive considerations play a major role
here.148
difficulties inherent in determining the "intention" of a multimember body).
147 "'If we ask what subject matter judges as a class are most knowledgeable about
(aside from legal doctrine), it is surely politics. It is not physics, chemistry, biology,
engineering, economics, social psychology,' or other tools that might be necessary in
evaluating the effects, rather than the justifications, of public policies." Trumps, supra
note 1, at 754 n.92 (quoting Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynam-
ics Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legis-
lation, 85 MIcH. L. REV. 1865, 1872-73 (1997)).
1 That doctrines may be best justified in expressivist terms does not, of course,
mean that they are right. There is an enormous wealth of literature debating the mer-
its of constitutionalizing federalism. We do not purport to engage in those debates in
any significant way, but merely to suggest a perspective on the developing doctrine that
is not explored fully elsewhere and that links those doctrines to other doctrines of con-
stitutional law. For some of the exemplary recent entries in the general debate, see
DAvID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE (1995); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Govern-
ment of Limited and Enumerated Powers': In Defense ofUnited States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L.
REV. 752 (1995) (arguing in favor of the revival of the doctrine of federalism in the
Court's decisions); Friedman, supra note 131 (discussing the benefits of both centrali-
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In New York v. United States and Printz v. United States, the Court
held that, in exercising its Article I legislative powers, Congress can
neither coerce state legislatures to enact laws 9 nor coerce state execu-
tive officials to enforce federal laws.'" The Court, however, permitted
Congress to utilize many other means of obtaining state participation
in effectuating federal policies. Congress can provide States with in-
centives for enacting laws, and offer States money for enforcing fed-
eral laws.'5' It can preempt entire regulatory fields, directly displacing
state law-making power over specific subjects; conditionally preempt
state regulatory powers over a subject unless the State complies with
federal conditions; and condition federal grants on the States' will-
ingness to comply with various federal conditions and purposes. The
Constitution therefore permits Congress to "encourage" certain state
action, but not to commandeer it.52 We will first sketch an expressive
account of these decisions, then compare it to the more immediate




Under the Constitution, the States are distinct governmental enti-
ties in the complex structure of the overall system of democratic self-
government. If this distinctness has any meaning, it is that States are
not mere administrative units of the national government and cannot
be treated as such. TM The maintenance of States as distinct govern-
mental entities does not, of course, possess an intrinsic value. Rather,
zation and federalism); Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1485
(1994) (discussing the evolution of federalist doctrine); DeborahJ. Merritt, Federalism
As Empowermen4 47 FLA. L. REV. 541 (1995) (discussing the Court's focus on
empowerment of multiple units of government as a rationale for federalism); Edward
L. Rubin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 U.C.L. L.
REV. 903 (1994) (arguing against using federalism to constrain national policy).
19 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992) (holding that "[tihe
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal regu-
latory program").
0 See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997) (applying the rationale of
New York to strike down the Brady Handgun Violence Protection Act).
" See New York, 505 U.S. at 166 (noting that Congress retains "the ability to en-
courage a State to regulate in a particular way [and to) hold out incentives to the
States as a method of influencing a State's policy choices").
" See id. (stating that Congress has the ability to encourage States to act a certain
way as long as this encouragement does not take the form of coercion).
' Ongoing conversations with our colleague Professor Rick Hills significantly in-
form this discussion.
"i As Professor Tribe puts it, States constitutionally must be recognized as "more
than just territorially based departments of an omnipotent central authority .... "
Laurence H. Tribe, Saenz Sans Prophecy: Does the Privileges or Immunities Revival Portend
the Future-Or Reveal the Structure ofthe Present?, 113 HARv. L. REV. 110, 111 (1999).
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the constitutional structure presupposes that federalism will help real-
ize some of the goods typically associated with this institutional con-
figuration: more direct participation in government; more experi-
ment and innovation; the diversity of choices a federal structure
permits; the efficiencies of decentralization; and a reduced risk of ty-
rannical government when political power is divided across two gov-
115
ernmental levels. Achieving any of the benefits associated with fed-
eralism, however, presupposes that States remain distinct
governmental entities, not merely arms of the national government.
If there are any expressive constraints on national power vis-a.-vis
the States, they likely are based on the distinct governmental status of
States, which must be acknowledged and maintained to achieve the
benefits associated with federalism. The principle articulated in the
pathbreaking New York decision seems a particularly appropriate can-
didate for such an expressive constraint. 16 If there is anyjudicially en-
forced aspect to the distinct governmental status of States, it would
surely seem to require that the most basic reflection of that distinct-
ness-the choice to enact or not to enact specific laws-not be under
the thumb of. Congress. Forced legislation, no less than forced
speech, can violate constraints on the means national power can
adopt to pursue otherwise legitimate ends. The follow-up decision
in Printz is more difficult and more controversial. In Printz, state ex-
ecutive officials were told to implement federal policy, but were not
forced seemingly to endorse it in as invasive a way as actually voting to
adopt it."" The Court presents the decision as an extension of New
York, and surely that is a plausible, if not compelled, ground on which
to understand it. In the Court's view, national commandeering of
state executive officials, like national commandeering of state legisla-
tive officials, fails to respect the sovereignty of state institutions that
'5' Historically, of course, federalism also has served some of the most offensive
values in American history, such as those associated with slavery. The Constitution has
been modified substantially in an attempt to address the pernicious excesses of federal-
ism. States have not been eliminated, however, and their continuing constitutional
status is based on the desirable, long-term consequences that our post-Civil War modi-
fied federalism seeks to achieve.
..6 See New York, 505 U.S. at 188.
117 For an earlier defense of New York v. United States on these grounds, see Pildes &
Niemi, supra note 1, at 520 n.123.
. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 926-27 (1997) (describing the Govern-
ment's argument that the Brady Bill was distinguishable from the statute in New Yor*
because it did not "require state legislative or executive officials to make policy, but
instead issue [d] a final directive to state CLEOs").
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the Constitution requires. 9 The political relationships constituted by
and expressed through national legislation that simply orders state of-
ficials to become vehicles of Congress is, in the Court's view, inconsis-
tent with the structural relationships that the Constitution establishes.
Adam Cox has elegantly documented how much of the language
and rhetoric of justification in these decisions sounds in expressive
terms.' The very word "commandeering" conjures up militaristic im-
ages, an extreme exercise of subordination and invasion justified, if
ever, only by the most exigent necessities. In Printz, Justice Scalia
characterizes Congress as having "dragooned" state officials and as
having reduced the States to "[pluppets of a ventriloquist Con-
gress,"161 Which hardly seems consistent with the "[p] reservation of the
States as independent political entities."162 Similarly, at the oral argu-
ment of Printz, members of the Court depicted Congress as making
the States "simply dance like marionettes on the fingers of the Federal
Government." 16 This is a language of degradation, subordination,
and domination. Such language does not focus directly or immedi-
ately upon the dysfunctional or negative policy consequences that
some may think commandeering produces. It is language concerned
with disrespect for the constitutionally stipulated relations between
the federal government and the States.
One might link New York and Printz's expressive concerns to spe-
cific cultural effects those decisions might produce,1 such as the ten-
dency, perhaps, of these decisions to make federal policymakers more
self-conscious of the values of constitutional federalism. But an ex-
pressive justification of those decisions need not rest on such far-
reaching cultural effects. Perhaps these decisions will indeed inspire
federal policymakers to be more attentive to the distinct governmental
status of the States, even beyond the constitutional prohibitions on
9 See id. at 935 ("The Federal Government may neither issue directives requiring
the States to address particular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.").
160 See Adam B. Cox, Expressivism in Federalism: A New Defense of the Printz Anticom-
mandeering Rule, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2000) (unpublished manuscript of
Jan. 29, 2000, at 24-26, on file with authors and the University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view) (interpreting recent federalism decisions as grounded in expressivist concerns).
This paragraph in the text borrows directly from Cox's fine piece.
16. 521 U.S. at 928 (citations omitted).
162 I& at 919.
16 Oral Argument, Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (Nos. 95-1478, 95-
1503), available at 1996 WL 706933, at *38.
'" For a discussion of the cultural effects of these decisions, see Cox, supra note
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"commandeering."10 Perhaps they will cause citizens to perceive
more clearly the sovereignty of the States, and to recognize that these
enhanced perceptions will have further desirable consequences for
the overall performance of the federal structure.'6 We do not think
that the decisions depend upon speculation of this sort. In part, we
wonder about the capacity of courts to assess these kinds of matters.167
To suppose that courts must be making such judgments is to invite
skeptical critics to ask whether "anyone think[s] that the Brady Act
was really read by a substantial segment of the public as the precursor
to the elimination of state sovereignty."1' Expressive interpretations
are concerned with the expressive character of laws, not with the di-
rect cultural effects of decisions, with how some segment of the public
reacts to a decision, or with extremely speculative parades of horri-
bles.
Beyond focusing on the decision's language of justification, how
would one try to "prove" whether the motivation for doctrines rests on
expressive or functional grounds? One means, of course, is to see
which grounds provide more convincing rationalizations for the pat-
terns of doctrine.
While the federalism cases can be rationalized on expressive
grounds, it is harder to make sense of them from most functional per-
spectives. First, any time the debate about constitutional doctrines in-
volving governmental structures is framed in complex functional
terms, the argument against judicial involvement will become power-
ful. Is Congress not in a better position than the Court to calculate
whether public policy would be enhanced were Congress to possess
the power to commandeer state institutions,6 to employ legislative
vetoes, or to empower the President with a line-item veto?170 Second,
the anticommandeering decisions fail to ensure state control over the
substance of policy domains because Congress can preempt those
' This possibility is considered in Matthew D. Adler & Seth F. Kreimer, The New
Etiquette of Federalism: New York, Printz, andYeskey, 1998 Sup. Cr. REv. 71, 134.
16 This possibility is considered in Cox, supra note 160, at manuscript 20-22 (argu-
ing that perceptions of state autonomy help preserve the States as credible political
institutions).
167 We depart from Cox on this point. See id.
168 Adler & Kreimer, supra note 165, at 141.
169 For one version of this critique, see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Constitutional
Self-Government 4 (Sept. 20, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Univer-
sity of Pennsylvania Law Review).
170 The Court similarly held the latter two unconstitutional in INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 959 (1983) (finding the legislative veto unconstitutional), and Clinton v. New
York, 524 U.S. 417, 444 (1998) (striking down line-item veto provisions).
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domains. Furthermore, Congress retains other powerful, even com-
pelling means of influencing States to do its bidding. The doctrines
constrain only the means Congress uses to gain final control, not the
fact that it does retain final control. In response, functionalists have
charged, third, that the anticommandeering doctrines are at best
mere matters of "etiquette."171 But surely, this argument continues,
constitutional law is about more than etiquette, especially given that
concrete rights, powers, and policies turn on these rules of law. If
there are no direct functional justifications for the decisions, then
they can only elevate form over substance-another manifestation of
the always-difficult-to-extirpate impulse toward legal formalism.
Expressive understanding of the federalism cases avoids these
functionalist critiques. First, expressive rationales do not depend on
complex calculations of effects in particular cases. This is not to say
that expressive doctrines are not concerned with consequences.
Again, the ultimatejustification for such doctrines will be in terms of
the consequences for human welfare that they help realize. The way
the law seeks to realize these consequences is not in a direct manner
through some case-by-case instrumental calculation, but rather indi-
rectly, through ensuring that laws express the constitutionally-
required understandings of the appropriate structural relationship.
Second, expressive constraints are indeed constraints on the
means used to realize various ends. As such, they are not justified in
terms of the end states they permit or produce functionally, but in
terms of how well they interpret and protect the underlying values
that ground these constraints. Congress's preemption of a field of
state policy expresses the superior political competence of the na-
tional government. When Congress conscripts state officials and or-
ders them to legislate or execute federal laws, however, state officials
become subordinates of Congress.
Third, from an expressive perspective, the charge of mere "eti-
quette" is nothing more than a disparaging label for means-based le-
gal constraints. All legal rules that constrain some means of achieving
ends, but not others, could be belittled as matters of mere etiquette.
But "etiquette" is not so trivial: norms demanding public acknowl-
edgment of the respect we owe to one another, or that groups and
States owe to one another, are constitutive of the ways important rela-
tionships are mutually understood. All could be equally dismissed as
171 See Adler & Kreimer, supra note 165, at 134 (suggesting that anticommandeer-
ing doctrines "may tend to guard against unthinking violation of [federal] values").
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mere etiquette.
Another possibility is that the Court's decisions might be an amal-
gam of expressive and functional considerations. Professor Hills ar-
gues that Congress will not enact efficient policies if it is permitted to
use state enforcement services for free. To ensure that Congress con-
siders the opportunity costs of those services, it needs to pay for
them. 72  The anticommandeering decisions therefore make func-
tional sense when interpreted as encouraging a properly structured
market in intergovernmental programs.
There is certainly force to this point. The oral arguments in Printz
suggest that this consideration was part of that which troubled the
Court.1 73 But knowing whether a market in intergovernmental services
would inflict functional efficiency, similarly to private markets, would
require empirical insight into issues such as potential holdout prob-
lems, how politically free States and local governments are to turn
down federal grants, and similar matters.17 The opinions do not em-
phasize efficiency concerns at all, let alone offer a detailed efficiency-
enhancing justification reflecting attention to the workings of a mar-
ket in intergovernmental services. If these kinds of functional con-
cerns played a role, then it seems most plausible to think that they did
so in tandem with the expressive justifications that dominate the
Court's language. Justices who believe that commandeering violates
central expressive constraints on how Congress must relate to the
States might be satisfied by a thin functional explanation-that the
decisions might also make for more efficient policy and will not make
outcomes drastically worse. We can debate whether the Court has
adopted the appropriate expressive understandings of the federal re-
lationship, but here we only suggest that the decisions require the de-
bate to be framed, at least in part, in expressive terms.
A mix of expressive and more directly functional considerations
seems best to explain the Court's recent state sovereign-immunity de-
cisions. Justice Kennedy's opinion in Alden v. Maine deploys expres-
sivist language perhaps more explicitly than in any other judicial dis-
'7 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State
Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 862-63
(1998) (concluding that state governments often will forego federal funds if they must
pay the related opportunity costs).
173 See Oral Argument, Printz v. United States, supra note 163, at*39-42.
174 Hills does attempt to provide a full policy-analytic justification of anticomman-
deering on purely functional grounds. See Hills, supra note 172, at 871 (considering
the potential harm to the nation of these entitlements).
171 119 S. Ct. 2240 (1999).
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cussion of constitutional federalism. The opinion repeatedly refers to
the constitutionally-underwritten "dignity" of the States;176 to the "es-
teem" with which Congress must regard States as sovereign entities;77
to the "essential attributes" inhering in the States' constitutional
status; 78 and to the requirement that Congress "treat the States in a
manner consistent with their status as residuary sovereigns and joint
participants in the governance of the Nation." 79 The Court's mode of
analysis is also predominantly historical, an effort to determine the
meaning and character that the States' constitutional status has had in
the original and ongoing practice of American constitutionalism.
All this has a strong expressivist cast. Indeed, the entire architec-
ture of sovereign immunity and its qualifications, cabined in as it is
with such exceptions as the Ex parte Young80 doctrine permitting de-
claratory and injunctive actions against state officers, appears preemi-
nently concerned with the form and means by which States are held
accountable to federal law.
At the same time, however, more direct functional accounts of
damages immunity are readily at hand, and Justice Kennedy explicitly
adverts to these as well. Thus, "[u]nderlying constitutional form are
considerations of great substance. Private suits against nonconsenting
States-especially suits for money damages-may threaten the finan-
cial integrity of the States." 8' Moreover, in the Court's view, potential
financial liability "would place unwarranted strain on the States' ability
to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens. "1 82 Note,
though, that this functional concern for democratic participation and
responsiveness must itself be interpreted and understood expressively,
at least to the extent the justification for democracy itself rests upon
the ideal of the political equality of all citizens. Thus, the sovereign
immunity decisions combine a strong expressivist concern with more
specific potential material consequences. Yet, at the same time, those
material consequences themselves ultimately must be based upon ex-
'7 Id. at 2247, 2264.
,7 Id. at 2268.
78 Id. at 2247.
' I. at 2263; see also id. at 2268-69.
"'o 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
181 Alden, 119 S. Ct. at 2264. Unanticipated financial liability imposed against non-
consenting States has been a constant concern for Justice Kennedy in particular. See
Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 655 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissent-
ing) ("Only if States receive clear notice of the conditions attached to federal funds
can they guard against excessive federal intrusion into state affairs. . .
12 Alden, 119 S Ct. at 2264.
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pressive concerns for democratic political equality. None of this is to
assess whether the decisions are right; the mere fact that decisions rest
in part or in whole upon expressive considerations does not, of
course, make them "right." This Article claims only that expressive
analysis is centrally related to contemporary doctrine in structural ar-
eas of the Constitution.
Expressive theories of law, as we have shown, are deeply con-
cerned with the form of the law. The rules of law and morality are
pervasively structured through differences in the form with which ac-
tion is taken, as Leo Katz has so convincingly shown.183 Examples in-
clude distinctions between acts and omissions, between losses infficted
and gains foregone, between doing and letting happen, and between
purposeful and accidental consequences. Because these expressive
constraints in both private and public law are so central to the struc-
ture of law, it is hard to imagine a legal regime that does not distin-
guish between the "forms" through which action occurs. Such a legal
regime is improbable because the underlying values that the law seeks
to protect, in both constitutional law and elsewhere, require for their
protection that actions be taken in ways that express respect for those
values. '84
IV. ADLER'S INTERPRETivE ERRORS
Having laid out a general statement of expressive theories of law
and their application to specific issues, we turn finally to Adler's cri-
tiques. Our account of the basic features of an expressive theory of
law differs from the position Adler attributes to expressivism and then
criticizes. To a large extent, the target Adler attacks is not one we
wish to defend, nor is it one our previous writings have advanced.
Even with a proper account of expressivism in view, however, Adler
clearly would continue to be troubled by expressive theories of law.
In replying, we therefore face a two-fold task. First, we need to
identify precisely where our account of the fundamental concern of
'8 See Leo Katz, Form and Substance in Law and Morality, 66 U. CII. L. REV. 566, 568-
79 (1999) (discussing the formalistic nature of everyday morality that underlies law).
"4 Appropriate concern with form in law should not be equated with legal formalism.
Legal formalism entails applying legal rules, categories, concepts, and forms without
regard to the underlying purposes or values those rules ought to serve. Expressive
constraints, by contrast, pay attention to these underlying purposes and values. Noth-
ing in expressivist concern for form requires that such a concern be applied in a
wooden, mechanical way. For criticism of some modern writers concerned with vindi-
cating formal distinctions who do reason about them in just this way, see Richard H.
Pildes, Forms of Formalism, 66 U. CI. L. REV. 607 (1999).
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an expressive theory of law diverges from the position Adler attributes
to expressivists. Second, we need to locate our remaining points of
contention.
With regard to the first task, the key difference resides in the con-
cept of "expression." In our view, Adler confuses the concept of ex-
pression with the concept of communication. Once the concept of
expression is understood as expressivists understand it, many of Ad-
ler's criticisms of expressive theories clearly miss the point After ex-
plaining the appropriate concept of expression, this Part will argue
that our remaining disagreements with Adler are based on some pro-
foundly interconnected philosophical errors he has made regarding
the nature of communication, meaning, and collective action.
A. ConfusingExpression with Communication
The above account of expressive theories of law, morality, and
practical reason is concerned with the attitudes and ideas that indi-
viduals and institutions express, not just with the attitudes and ideas
that they communicate.1 To express a state of mind is, among other
things, to manifest it in action. To communicate a state of mind is to
act with the intention of inducing others to recognize that state of
mind by recognizing that very communicative intention. Communica-
tive acts are only a small subset of all expressive acts.
Adler commits a simple but fundamental error in construing ex-
pressive theories of law, morality, and reason as concerned only with
communicative acts. In his view, expressive theories of law must by
definition have nothing to say about action that is not intended to
communicate a particular idea-actions that, for this reason, Adler
labels as expressively "meaningless." Such actions are expressively
meaningless in Adler's view precisely because they are not intended as
communicative acts. He manifests this confusion in his attempts to
identify expressivist "moral factors" with particular linguistic utter-
ances. But expressive theories of morality and law primarily concern
the expression of attitudes-respect and contempt, friendship and
hostility, unity and division, endorsement and condemnation, and so
forth. Adler instead reduces this concern to one he believes can be
captured fully by a concern for linguistic utterances alone.
Adler has two main descriptive or declarative ways of understand-
185 In our view, this confusion is also central to Steven Smith's critique of the "no
endorsement" test in Establishment Clause doctrine. See Smith, supra note 109, at 286-
91. This confusion takes the force out of much of Smith's critique.
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ing expression that inappropriately reduce it to linguistic utterances.
According to Adler, expressive theories of law may be concerned with
either (1) judgments of value or (2) professions of attitudes.8 6 But
expressive concerns, both in theory and in legal practice, are much
broader than these limited alternatives.
Sometimes Adler suggests that what expressive theories of law ad-
dress is the State's communication of value judgments.'8 7 According
to this view, racial segregation is wrong because it invokes a conven-
tion for communicating the value judgment: "blacks are inferior."
This construal dramatically narrows the point and scope of expressive
theories of law. Uttering such value judgments is not the only way,
much less the worst way, to express contempt for blacks. Calling
someone "nigger" expresses contempt without expressing any value
judgment. But segregating public facilities and under-funding the fa-
cilities designated for blacks does so as well. What expressive theories
of the Equal Protection Clause find objectionable are all expressions
of contempt for blacks, whether or not linguistically equivalent to
communicating a value judgment.
At other times, Adler reduces the expressivists' fundamental
communications of concern to professions of attitudes."8 This con-
fuses expression with profession. To express an attitude is, among
other things, to put it into action. To profess an attitude is to claim
that one has that attitude. Expressive theories of law, reason, and mo-
rality say that various agents ought to express certain attitudes. They do
186 We can, of course, use language to do other things besides describe states of
affairs. For example, in uttering different words in the right contexts, we can promise,
vote, warn, apologize, command, and so forth. In the ungainly terminology of the phi-
losophy of language, what we do in saying something is called the "illocutionary force"
of an utterance. This is contrasted both with the "locutionary force" or meaning of an
utterance, which is found in the act of saying something, and with the "perlocutionary
force" of an utterance, which is what we do by saying something. Suppose I say to you,
"Please pass the salt." The locutionary force of this utterance is simply the act of utter-
ing these words with their standard English meaning. Its illocutionary force is to re-
quest that the addressee pass the salt. Its perlocutionary force-that is, its causal im-
pact-is to induce the addressee to pass the salt. These distinctions were first drawn by
J. L. AusTiN, HOW TO Do THINGS wrr WORDs (1962). This Part focuses on Adler's
attempts to reduce the expressive meaning of legal actions to descriptive or perhaps
declarative acts. The next Part focuses on an alternative, nondescriptive account of the
illocutionary force of the State's communicative acts, arguing that Adler fails to see
how communicative acts can be meaningful in creating or dissolving important human
relationships.
7 SeeAdler, supra note 2, at 1385-86, 1435-40.
"8 See id. at 1386-87, 1444-46 (describing his interpretation of Expressionism as
"endorsement" of attitudes).
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not say that agents must profess these attitudes. 9 Even sincerely and
accurately professing one's state of mind may self-defeatingly fail to
express it. If a well-meaning State posted signs at public restrooms
saying "Jews are welcome here," would this action, by calling attention
to the religion of those welcomed, genuinely express welcome for
them, or would it express an embarrassing unease over their pres-
ence?
Because Adler thinks expressive theories of law and morality are
concerned only with linguistic utterances or their equivalents, he sup-
poses that whatever an expressive theory requires us to do can be
achieved equally well simply by uttering certain words. For example,
he attributes to expressive theories of punishment the view that
"[p]unishing crime C is meaningful and, in particular, expresses con-
demnation, in the very same way that the utterance, 'crime Cis wrong'
is meaningful and expresses condemnation."19' It would certainly save
public finances if this were true, but would anyone believe such a posi-
tion? Certainly we do not, nor do we know of any expressivist writings
that take such a bizarre view.91 Suppose a defendant convicted of a
vicious crime is brought before ajudge for sentencing. Thejudge de-
clares, "Your crime is horrific and wrong, and the State condemns you
for it," and then releases the convict without punishment. The out-
raged public would naturally think that the judge did not really mean
what he said. The public would certainly be right in the sense in
which we care about the practice of punishment. To condemn mean-
ingfully requires not a mere utterance, even in the form of a stem lec-
ture from the bench, but a practice of punishment socially under-
stood to express condemnation effectively, such as incarceration. Of
189 We note in passing that Adler's claim that noncognitivists cannot claim that cer-
tain actions are really wrong or impermissible rests on exactly this same confusion. He
seems to think that noncognitivists translate value judgments into professions of atti-
tudes-that they treat "x is impermissible" as equivalent to "I do not approve of x." See
i. at 1383-84. This interpretation of noncognitivism is mistaken for the same reasons
Adler's understanding of expression is erroneous. Noncognitivists claim that value
judgments have no truth values. But the claims of the form "I do not approve of x" are
straightforwardly true or false. If valuejudgments essentially referred to attitudes, they
would be straightfowardly true or false. Noncognitivists say that value judgments ex-
press the speaker's attitudes, not that they profess or refer to those attitudes.
"o Adler, supra note 2, at 1385.
'91 Dan Kahan, one of the expressivists whom Adler criticizes, explicitly rejects pre-
cisely this "standard" confusion concerning an expressivist account of punishment. See
Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Ci. L. REV. 591, 600-01
(1996) (noting thatjudicial communication of condemnation through words does not
express condemnation in the same way that the action and practice of actual punish-
ment does).
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course, the forms of punishment that properly express the requisite
condemnation can change as cultural understandings change. The
State expresses its condemnation of criminals by punishing convicts
for good reason; its expression of condemnation is not confined just
to distinct linguistic acts that accompany that punishment. Thus, ut-
tering words does not express condemnation "in the very same way"
that punishment does. Such a strange position is not one to which
expressivists subscribe. The linguistic utterance does not mean the
same thing as the practice of condemnation, even when it purports to.
There are some things we can express only with deeds because words
alone cannot adequately convey our attitudes.
Any normative theory that concerns itself only with communica-
tion would be peculiarly narrow. No expressivist writing of which we
are aware rests on this truncated view. 11 But it is only on such an arti-
ficially narrow view that Adler can criticize expressive theories of equal
protection and establishment for failing to condemn so many state
laws that courts should and do find unconstitutional. The actions he
classifies as "meaningless," and hence beyond the scope of expressive
theories of law, are actions performed without communicative intent.
But such actions do not, for that reason, lack expressive content, nor
do the courts view them as expressively meaningless. As Lynch makes
clear, state actions can fail the endorsement test for unintentionally
"communicating" certain ideas-that is, for expressing them.'93 Ad-
ler's narrow conception of expressive theories of law is therefore nei-
ther the view theorists advance nor that upon which courts act.
19 4
"' Kahan, for example, expressly rejects it. See Kahan, supra note 56, at 419. John
Broome commits the identical error of confusing expression with communication in
criticizing the expressive theory of practical reason advanced by one of us in
ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICs AND ECONOMiCS (1993). See Adler, supra note
2, at 1455 n.315 (quotingJohn Broome, Review, 9 RATIO (NEW SERIES) 90, 92 (1996)).
Thus the point that Adler cites as a "fatal criticism" of expressive theories of action is
based on a simple misinterpretation.
1'3 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("It
is only practices having... [the effect of communicating government endorsement or
disapproval of religion], whether intentionally or unintentionally, that make religion
relevant... to status in the political community.").
194 Interestingly, Adler's narrow view of expression does seem to track one very
specific doctrinal problem-that of "symbolic" speech under the First Amendment.
Precisely because so much conduct is expressive in the sense we invoke, the First
Amendment, if extended beyond pure speech at all, could not possibly protect all
conduct that also had expressive character. Instead, only conduct that is expressive in
the very specific sense of intending to communicate specific ideas and emotions (and
perhaps also likely to be understood as communicative) is potentially protected-and
it is principally protected in the context in which government regulation alms at the
supression of the ideas intended to be communicated. For a concise and illuminating
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Adler's confusion of expression with communication further leads
him to artificially separate expressive from justificatory accounts of le-
gal doctrine. Recall that according to our view, attitudes are ex-
pressed in the purposes for which people act and the principles that
justify their action (that is, in principles of form R). A person suffers
an expressive harm in being treated in accordance with principles that
express inappropriate attitudes toward her. State actions that rest on
such unjustified principles can be unconstitutional for that reason,
apart from their effects. Legal doctrines that invalidate action by sole
reason of their purpose, or on account of the failure of their purpose
to justify the means selected, are therefore expressive in form.
Ironically, Adler's own view of individual rights and of equal pro-
tection in his other scholarship makes the most sense from an expres-
sive perspective. In his other work, Adler defines constitutional rights
as rights against rules, as opposed to rights to certain outcomes.
9 5
This is meant as a counter to the view that rights are all-purpose
trumps. Adler's view on the nature of rights is one we share. 6 In
other words, individuals have rights that protect against certain of
their interests and liberties being infringed by the State for certain pur-
poses. But this is precisely to define rights in terms of expressive prin-
ciples of form R Similarly, Adler proposes that a law that "unjustifia-
bly discriminates on racial lines" violates the Equal Protection
Clause. 7 Yet Adler, understandably, leaves unspecified his notion of
what makes racial discrimination "unjustified." When it comes to pay-
ing off this promissory note it will be hard to offer such an account,
we believe, without including hostile and contemptuous purposes
discussion of this complex problem, see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONsOrr oNAL LAW 825-32 (2d ed. 1988).
In essence, Adler would reduce all constitutional concerns surrounding state ex-
pression to the narrowly targeted protection speakers receive for symbolic speech un-
der the First Amendment. Of course, the specific values the First Amendment protects
are limited and not co-extensive with the diverse values and purposes of other constitu-
tional provisions, such as structural provisions or those securing against the establish-
ment of religion.
195 See Adler, supra note 32, at 13-42 (arguing that "[c]onstitutional rights in our
own legal world are structured, not as shields around particular actions, but as shields
against particular rules").
1 See generally Richard H. Pildes, Dworkin's Two Conceptions of Rights, 29J. LEGAL
STuD. 309, 309 (discussing "the view that two distinct conceptions of the justification
and structure of constitutional rights can be found in constitutional theory"); Trumps,
supra note 1 (explaining how rights function in a variety of ways). Some rights might
be broader than the rights against rules account, but for the most part, Adler's formu-
lation captures well actual constitutional practice.
19 Adler, supra note 2, at 1431.
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among the "unjustified" discriminatory purposes. Any credible at-
tempt to specify Adler's criterion, we suggest, will have to include ex-
pressive considerations.
Adler compounds his confusion of expression and communica-
tion by failing to distinguish formal from material moral principles.
His entire "general argument" against expressive theories of moral
and legal norms consists of an attempt to enumerate all of the plausi-
ble substantive "moral factors" that could bear on an assessment of ac-
tion, and a demonstration that virtually none of them (except a deon-
tological constraint against lying) have communicative content. This
argumentative strategy works only if the constraining power of an ex-
pressive theory must be located in some substantive considerations
that are on par with other moral factors, such as welfare and desert.
But this is akin to arguing that the operation of multiplication is ir-
relevant to mathematics because it is not found in an enumeration of
all of the types of numbers (rational, real, imaginary, and so forth).
Expressive theories constrain action by constraining the ways in which
we take various moral factors into consideration. They specify the
form of normatively required constraints on action, not the contents
of specific moral factors.
Expressivism is not an independent, substantive moral or political
philosophy that specifies content-laden grounds on which the State
cannot act. The contents of expressive legal constraints must come
from the values that inform the constitutional order, such as the prin-
ciples that political liberalism require or that specific constitutional
provisions guarantee: principles of equal concern and respect, relig-
ious toleration, equal citizenship, and the like. Expressivism explains
how our practices realize those substantive values in expressing them.
We express equal concern and respect, religious toleration, a concep-
tion of ourselves as equal citizens, and so forth by following principles
of form R Expressivism argues that these values are realized, in large
part, by action on formal principles that constrain the means through
which the State pursues various legitimate ends.
B. Communication, Shared Understandings, and Social Relationships
Given our fundamentally different understanding of the concept
of expression, it may seem as if all of Adler's criticisms fail to join issue
directly with us. He critiques a much narrower theory than we or
other expressivists advocate, a theory that evaluates only communica-
tive acts.
Yet it remains true that even on the right account of expressivism,
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communicative actions play an important role. At this point, we join
issue with Adler more directly. On this point, we do not charge Adler
with misunderstanding expressive theories, but we do have some
philosophically deep disagreements with Adler's approach.
At root, we disagree with Adler about how communicative acts
make a difference to the world. In our view, successful communica-
tive acts establish shared or collective understandings between speaker
and audience. When what is successfully communicated (mutually
acknowledged) is the speaker's attitudes toward those addressed, an
understanding of the attitude that governs the speaker's interactions
with the addressee is shared between them. Such understandings are
constitutive of social relatonships.98 These understandings can be es-
tablished through communications with various kinds of what formal
philosophy of language awkwardly refers to as "illocutionary force."9
Some communications invite or dare people to enter social relation-
ships. Legal communications of state attitudes typically impose social
relationships on people: they change their legal or citizenship status.
These relationships may be valuable, as relations of equality among
citizens are, or harmful, as relations of contempt and hostility are.
Because social relationships are built on mutual acknowledgment and
thus shared understandings of the terms on which the parties interact,
failures of such acknowledgment (or failures to communicate in con-
texts where communication is demanded) can have meaning too-as
withdrawals or repudiations of established, assumed, or hoped-for re-
lationships.
Adler does not see how communications (or failures to communi-
cate) can establish or break social relationships. This lies at the root
of his failure to recognize the distinctive character of expressive
harms. We trace this failure to two intimately connected philosophi-
cal problems. First, Adler denies the very possibility of genuinely col-
lective or shared understandings. Groups, he appears to think, can-
not share beliefs in any robust, nonreductive sense. Second, he
adheres to Grice's speaker-centered theory of meaning and Searle's
speech-act theory of what we do in speaking (the "illocutionary force"
of speech). The two errors are of a piece. According to a Gricean
s Of course, the speaker and addressee may negotiate over the terms of their rela-
tionship. We do not wish to suggest that communicative creation of social relation-
ships is a unidirectional act from the speaker to the addressee. Normally, the parties
to a relationship take turns speaking and listening.
9 See supra note 186 (providing a brief overview ofJohn Austin's approach to lan-
guage's many uses).
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view of communication, meanings are primarily identified with the
speaker's intentions. According to Searle's speech-act theory, com-
munication itself is viewed as a unilateral act on the speaker's part.
These individualistic and reductionist views represent the goal of
communication as producing a unilateral response on the part of the
addressee. In the classical Gricean account, the aim of communica-
tion is to induce a belief. Such accounts therefore classify the ad-
dressee's understanding of an utterance as a purely incidental causal
consequence of speaking-that is, as part of its "perlocutionary force."
The Gricean and Searlean views fail to acknowledge that commu-
nication is a joint act-something we do together. As one critic ob-
serves of Searle, "For him, linguistic communication is like writing a
letter and dropping it in the mail. It doesn't matter whether anybody
receives, reads, or understands it."2 Searle's view is flawed because
the completion of the communicative act requires that the addressee
understand what the speaker has said. Absent such an understanding,
the speaker has not communicated anything. In the standard termi-
nology of speech-act theory, the addressee's grasp of a communication
is part of its illocutionary force-what we do in communicating-not
merely part of its perlocutionary force-what the speaker causes by
communicating. 1 Communication is not something a speaker can do
alone; it is something the speaker and addressee do together.
Once it is understood that communication is a joint act, our con-
ception of the constitutive aim of communication must be revised.
The goal of communication is not merely to induce a unilateral re-
sponse in the addressee. It is to bring out certain ideas between us, in
public space, in order to make what is communicated an object of mu-
202
tual, or shared, recognition. The subject of this shared recognition
is us, not you and I considered separately. Adler cannot see this be-
cause he thinks group mental states must somehow be reduced to uni-
213
lateral mental states of all, or most, members of a group.
200 HERBERT H. CLARK, USING LANGUAGE 137-38 (1996).
20' "Speaker's meaning is a type of intention that can be discharged only through
joint actions. Illocutionary acts... can be accomplished only as parts ofjoint actions
Id. at 139.
212 Charles Taylor is one of the main theorists to advance this view. See CHARLES
TAYLOR, Language and Human Nature, in HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE:
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS I, 215, 215-47 (1985); CHARLES TAYLOR, Theories of Meaning in
HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE: PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS I, supra, at 248, 248-92. For
an extended critique of Grice from this point of view, see Charles Taylor, Book Review,
19 DIALOGUE 290 (1980).
23 SeeAdler, supra note 2, at 1390 ("[If the action of a multi-member legal body is
to possess a genuine speaker's meaning, the collective intention that confers such
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Suppose what is communicated between the speaker and ad-
dressee is the speaker's attitude toward the addressee. Mutual ac-
knowledgment of this attitude jointly commits the speaker and ad-
dressee to understanding this attitude as governing the speaker's
interactions with the addressee. This joint understanding is constitu-
tive of the nature of the social relationship. The illocutionary force of
this communicative act is carried simply by shared understanding of
what is communicated, not by any further psychological reactions (for
example, acceptance, defiance, or psychological trauma) of the ad-
dressee to what the speaker has said.
Adler fails to see how communications of attitudes can, in estab-
lishing shared understandings, make and break social relationships
and thereby expressively benefit and harm people. This causes him to
cast about for alternative accounts of how such communicative acts
could matter. The only place he can locate the significance of com-
munication is in the narrow space of what it linguistically means. The
effect of these definitional moves is to press expressivists into a di-
lemma: either (1) communications can mean something, but then it
is hard to see how they can matter very much, or (2) communications
can matter, but not in virtue of what they mean. Expressivists are im-
paled on the first horn of the dilemma if they focus on the speaker's
unilateral act of uttering words with a conventional sentence-meaning.
Given Adler's Gricean/Searlean framework, this act in itself cannot
matter much, any more than the utterances contained in a letter
dropped in the postbox can matter if the letter is never received.
To avoid this problem, Adler suggests that expressivists intend to
focus on the listener's unilateral act of reacting to what the speaker
says. This impales expressivists on the second horn of the dilemma,
because to focus on the listener's psychological reaction to the com-
munication is to focus on its causal impact. This seems to be what Ad-
ler thinks expressivists must mean to do. He repeatedly argues that
expressivists must think communications matter to equal protection
or establishment doctrine only when and because they inflict psycho-
logical trauma on the targets of a stigmatizing state expression, they
reduce some people's social standing by persuading other listeners to
accept the views and attitudes expressed in the communication, or
they have some other causal influence on listeners' psyches. Now the
jaws of the dilemma close. In the first case, Adler asserts that expres-
sivists can lay claim to a genuinely expressive theory, but one that is
meaning upon that action must be some function of the individual intentions of the
members.").
2000] 1573
1574 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 148:1503
rather implausible and irrelevant. In the second case, the theory is
more plausible, but it can no longer claim to be expressivist, since
even consequentialists would embrace a theory of law that focused on
such effects.
The entire dilemma dissolves, however, as soon as successful
communication is properly understood as a joint activity of the
speaker and addressee acting together, rather than simply as a unilat-
eral activity of one or the other party. Communication establishes a
public space of meanings and shared understandings between the
speaker and addressee. These understandings have normative force
for both sides because they are constituted by joint commitments. For
a meaning or understanding to have normative force, those for whom
it is normative must be able to get it wrong. Meanings can therefore
neither be reduced to the speakers' intentions-to what the speakers
think they are saying-nor to the addressees' subjective reactions to
what is said. The meanings of actions with which expressivists are
concerned are normative and cannot be reduced to purely subjective,
psychological, or empirical concepts such as speaker intentions and
addressee reactions. Both the speaker and addressee are held ac-
countable to public meanings. This means that the moral or legal
import of both state action and public reactions to state action de-
pends upon a prior judgment of the expressive meaning of the state
action. The meanings of action do matter after all, independent of
their causal consequences.
This conclusion applies with particular force to legal communica-
tions of state attitudes, which often impose different legal statuses on
the citizens and residents of a State-as first- or second-class citizens,
insiders and outsiders, innocents and convicts, and so forth. To avoid
ascribing moral import to these legal communications in themselves,
Adler shifts focus to the subjective reactions of addressees to these
communications. This puts him in the bizarre position of having to
argue that a law can be constitutionally invalid simply because it
makes people feel like they are inferior or outsiders, or induces other
people to regard them that way, but cannot be invalid because it
manifests the State's poor regard for them. This makes the State ac-
countable for everyone's attitudes but its own. Such a position could
seem credible only to someone who denies that collectives can have
mental states. As we have shown above, this is philosophically wrong
and would carry untenable moral and legal implications. Of course
we can analyze corporations as nexuses of contracts or study the in-
centives institutional environments give to individual actors within
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them. It is a mistake, however, to confuse the benefits of these forms
of positive social science with the normative concerns of the law. The
law could hardly deny collective agency to corporate or legislative in-
stitutions, and there is no theoretical or philosophical justification for
doing so.
CONCLUSION
This Article has offered the first general, theoretical account of
the aims and features of expressive theories of law, morality, and prac-
tical reason. We have sought to explain with some precision what it
means for individual and collective action to express purposes, values,
and attitudes, and why it is that law and morality ought to care about
these expressive dimensions of individual and collective action. Using
constitutional law as an example, we have also suggested that existing
legal practice is already oriented in significant respects toward expres-
sive concerns. As with many reconstructive projects, our hope is that a
deeper grasp of the structure and justification of expressivist ap-
proaches to law will enhance our collective capacity to better realize
the alms of such approaches. The expressive approach to law cap-
tures many intuitive understandings of the concerns of law. We hope
to have given more credence to those views by accounting for their
deep foundation.
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